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389 
Article 
Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of 
Moral Pluralism 
Katherine R. Kruse 
Some of the most compelling questions of legal ethics de-
fine the lawyers professional role in the gap between what is 
legally permitted and what is just.1 Perhaps for that reason, 
professional responsibility hypotheticals are replete with cli-
ents who want to use the law for arguably immoral purposes
from criminal defendants who want to avoid punishment to 
corporate executives who want to avoid government regula-
tion.2 Because these clients do not want to break the law out-
right, ethical standards do not clearly indicate whether lawyers 
should be professionally obligated to represent them or ethi-
cally restrained from doing so. Instead, questions about the 
lawyers role rest in larger issues of justice. 
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Simon, Jeff Stempel, Jean Sternlight, Paul Tremblay, Brad Wendel, and Rich-
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Reynolds for all his help. Finally, I owe thanks to my dean, Dick Morgan, and 
the generous supporters of the William S. Boyd School of Law for funding and 
nurturing an atmosphere so encouraging of scholarship in so young a law 
school. 
 1. See generally Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyers Ethics in the Gap Between 
Law and Justice, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 181 (1999). 
2. See, e.g., Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Edu-
cation, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1737 (1993) ([One of the] notable characteris-
tics of the clients who appear with frequency in professional responsibility 
courses [is that] they are almost always people who want wealth or freedom 
and have violated or are willing to violate commonly accepted norms of con-
duct to achieve these goals.). 
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The question whether representing an arguably immoral 
client serves or undermines justice divides legal ethicists into 
two main camps: traditionalists and social justice theorists. In 
the traditional model, or standard conception of lawyering, 
the gap between law and justice is not the concern of individual 
lawyers,3 who adopt an attitude of moral neutrality toward the 
interests of their clients.4 Traditionalists defend such amoral 
lawyering by appealing to the lawyers role of providing the cli-
ent with access to the law regardless of the purposes to which 
the client may wish to put the law.5 In contrast to this tradi-
tional model, social justice theorists propose alternative models 
in which the lawyer plays a more active role in conforming cli-
ent conduct to the requirements of justice.6 These social justice 
models hold individual lawyers professionally responsible for 
closing the gap between law and justice by refusing legal ser-
 
3. Stephen Pepper has been the leading defender of the traditional ad-
versarial model of lawyering. In a 1986 article, Pepper first laid out his de-
fense of amoral lawyering in what he called the first-class citizenship 
model. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyers Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a 
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 615 [herein-
after Pepper, Lawyers Amoral Role]. He has revisited and refined his view in 
later articles. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, Access to What?, 2 J. INST. FOR 
STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 269 (1999) (defending the primary role of lawyers as 
providing access to law, not justice, but discussing parameters for moral dia-
logue with clients concerning the gaps between law and justice); Stephen L. 
Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence 
and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995) [hereinafter Pepper, 
Counseling at the Limits] (discussing the considerations in answering the 
jurisprudential question of how to define the law to which lawyers are to 
provide access). 
 4. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Eth-
ics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73 (1980) (noting that moral neutrality is a central 
component of the standard conception of the lawyers role); William H. 
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 
1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36 (describing the principle of neutrality); see also 
Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 
CAL. L. REV. 669, 67374 (1978) (arguing for the lawyers moral nonaccount-
ability when operating as an advocate in the adversary system). 
 5. See, e.g., Pepper, Lawyers Amoral Role, supra note 3, at 61718. 
 6. This Article addresses three distinct yet related social justice models. 
The moral activist model, conceptualized primarily by David Luban, was laid 
out in a series of articles culminating in his 1988 book, DAVID LUBAN, LAW-
YERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988). The contextual lawyering 
model, originated in the work of William Simon, was also developed in a series 
of articles and more recently formulated in WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE 
OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS ETHICS (1998). The lawyer as friend 
model was developed by Thomas Shaffer and Robert Cochran in THOMAS L. 
SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY (1994). 
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vices to clients seeking immoral ends,7 interpreting the bounds 
of what is legally permitted in the way that best promotes jus-
tice,8 and structuring client counseling to ensure that moral 
considerations are addressed.9 
This Article revisits the debate between the traditional and 
social justice theorists10 by recasting the question at its center. 
Instead of inquiring what the lawyer should do when asked to 
assist an immoral client, it asks what the lawyer should do 
when asked to assist a client with whom the lawyer fundamen-
tally morally disagrees. By shifting the question away from the 
immorality of the client and onto the diversity of moral view-
points between the lawyer and client, this Article focuses atten-
tion on a subject that has been largely missing from the debate 
among legal ethicists: the challenge of moral pluralism.11 Moral 
pluralism recognizes the existence of a diversity of reasonable 
yet irreconcilable moral viewpoints, none of which can be objec-
tively declared to be right or wrong from a standpoint out-
side of its own theoretical framework.12  
 
 7. See, e.g., David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to 
Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 642 ([A] lawyers decision 
not to assist a client in a scheme that the lawyer finds nefarious is [not] any 
different from . . . other instances of social control through private noncoopera-
tion.). 
 8. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 6, at 13839. 
 9. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 48. 
 10. The debate is perhaps most classically framed in Symposium on the 
Lawyers Amoral Ethical Role, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, in which 
Stephen Pepper offers a defense of amoral lawyering, Pepper, Lawyers 
Amoral Role, supra note 3, and David Luban responds by defending the Ly-
sistratian prerogative of the lawyer not to represent a client bent on pursuing 
immoral ends, Luban, supra note 7. As Bradley Wendel recently noted, the dif-
ferences between the traditionalists and social justice lawyering theorists have 
developed into [a] remarkably stable debate . . . in legal ethics between those 
who regard[] lawyers as primarily moral agents who are under ordinary 
moral obligations notwithstanding their professional role and those who 
rel[y] on the professional role to create a kind of excuse for conduct that 
would be considered immoral if engaged in by non-professionals. W. Bradley 
Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 367 (2004). 
 11. Pluralism has been defined as a state of society in which members of 
diverse . . . groups maintain an autonomous participation in and development 
of their traditional culture or special interest within the confines of a common 
civilization. MERRIAM-WEBSTERS COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 955 (11th ed. 
2003). 
 12. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (discussing 
how modern democratic societies can accommodate differing viewpoints by 
emphasizing consensus on certain broad political conceptions). According to 
John Rawls, A modern democratic society is characterized . . . by a pluralism 
of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines . . . [n]o one of 
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What justice might look like in a morally pluralistic society 
has become a central issue in liberal political philosophy within 
the past decade.13 Despite its prominence in political philoso-
phy, however, legal ethicists have paid little attention to the 
significance of moral pluralism for and its impact on the debate 
over lawyers, morality, and justice.14 The recognition of moral 
 
[which] is affirmed by citizens generally. Id. at xvi. Rawls recognizes that 
these foundational disagreements are both reasonable and fundamentally ir-
reconcilable. See id. at xvixvii, xxivxxvi. 
 13. Recent analyses and critiques of the efforts of political philosophers to 
meet the challenges that moral pluralism poses for liberal theories of justice 
include, for example, ANDREA T. BAUMEISTER, LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS 
OF DIFFERENCE (2000) (arguing for a theory of liberalism based on value plu-
ralism in order to better accommodate difference); MONIQUE DEVEAUX, CUL-
TURAL PLURALISM AND DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE (2000) (arguing that most lib-
eral theorists do not adequately address issues of justice for cultural 
minorities and advocating a new approach that would offer political respect for 
and recognition of cultural pluralism); and JOHN TOMASI, LIBERALISM BEYOND 
JUSTICE: CITIZENS, SOCIETY, AND THE BOUNDARIES OF POLITICAL THEORY 
(2001) (arguing that the boundaries of liberal theorizing must be expanded be-
yond questions of justice and legitimacy). See also THE IDEA OF A POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON RAWLS (Victoria Davion & Clark Wolf eds., 2000) (col-
lecting essays that critique Rawlss efforts to ground his theory of justice in a 
morally neutral political conception); TOLERATION, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 
(John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1999) (collecting essays that respond to 
the problem of moral pluralism and attempt to provide a better understanding 
of difference and how to accommodate it by taking identity into account). 
Compare, e.g., JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM (2000) (arguing that in 
the face of moral pluralism, liberalism needs to abandon the search for a justi-
fication based on rational consensus), with WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL 
PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY 
AND PRACTICE (2002) (arguing, contrary to John Gray, for the continued vital-
ity of liberal theory even in the face of the persistence of deep value plural-
ism). 
 14. Recent lawyering theory literature that explores moral pluralism in-
cludes, for example, Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representa-
tion in a Pluralist Society, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984 (1995) (critiquing two 
main approaches to lawyering and offering additional principles to guide law-
yers); Wendel, supra note 10, at 36365 (commenting on the relationship be-
tween law and pluralism); W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional 
Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Wendel, Public 
Values] (outlining an approach to lawyering in a morally pluralistic society 
that considers the foundational values of the legal profession); and W. Bradley 
Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 113 (2000) (argu-
ing that a model of ethics for lawyers must include consideration and accom-
modation of different professional values). Additional discussions regarding 
morality and lawyering can be found in Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role 
Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853 (1992) (criticizing older and newer 
approaches to role morality for lawyers and arguing for another approach that 
reflects the individual moralities of lawyers rather than public norms); How-
ard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1469 (1998) (arguing that lawyers should not be forced to accommodate their 
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pluralism poses challenges for both the traditional and social 
justice models of lawyering. To help illustrate these challenges, 
this Article explores a hypothetical lawyer-client relationship 
in which a lesbian couple, in an effort to adopt or conceive a 
child, seeks legal assistance from a lawyer who believes that 
homosexuality is a morally corrupt lifestyle that damages chil-
dren. In such a case, the lawyer and the clients have morally 
diverseand probably irreconcilably differentviews of what 
morality and justice require, and there is no clear legal or socie-
tal consensus about which view is correct. 
As this Article demonstrates, neither the traditional nor 
the social justice models of lawyering provide an adequate ac-
count of the lawyers professional role in the face of fundamen-
tal moral disagreement. The traditional model fails because the 
vision of lawyering as technical expertise on which the model 
relies does not acknowledge the impact of the lawyers own 
moral commitments on the tasks of legal interpretation and le-
gal counseling. The model also fails because it does not provide 
adequate strategies for dealing with that impact in the face of 
fundamental moral disagreement. Similarly, the social justice 
models fail because, although they recognize a role for the law-
yers moral commitments in the tasks of lawyering, their justi-
fications for the lawyers refusal to accept a case on the grounds 
of morality or justice do not explain why the client deserves le-
gal representation at all. 
This Article proposes that in light of the existence of moral 
pluralism, lawyers should treat fundamental moral disagree-
ments under a moral conflict of interest analysis. A moral 
conflict of interest framework would both recognize that an in-
dividual lawyers moral commitments may impair legal repre-
sentation and provide a reason, based on the professional du-
ties that lawyers owe to clients, for affirming that lawyers 
should sometimes refuse representation on moral grounds. Al-
though the building blocks for a moral conflict of interest 
analysis are already present in existing ethical standards, the 
profession has been reluctant to wholeheartedly embrace the 
idea of moral conflicts of interest. As the language and applica-
tion of professional responsibility standards reflect, a fear of 
denying legal representation to unpopular clientssometimes 
 
moral beliefs to professional norms); and Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpret-
ing Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2003) (arguing in support of a 
client-centered lawyering approach in which lawyers serve their clients not-
withstanding personal disagreement with their clients goals). 
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described as the last lawyer in town problemunderlies the 
professions reluctance to allow lawyers the prerogative to de-
cline representation on moral grounds. 
Part I of this Article examines moral pluralism, focusing on 
the explanations that political and moral philosophers have 
given for how citizens within a stable and democratic society 
come to have divergent and irreconcilable moral beliefs, with 
attention to the implications of moral pluralism for legal ethics. 
It joins other legal ethicists in concluding that the existence of 
moral pluralism buttresses the traditionalist notion that law-
yers should not serve a moral screening function, denying ac-
cess to the law on the basis of their moral assessments of cli-
ents cases.15 However, it goes on to examine the lawyers 
internal moral perspective, showing that the very reasons that 
urge political tolerance of those with differing moral views also 
suggest that individuals will have strong commitments to their 
own moral beliefs. Parts II and III of this Article explore the 
implications of moral pluralism for legal ethics by applying the 
traditional model of lawyering and three social justice models 
to the lesbian family planning hypothetical and demonstrating 
the inadequacy of each model in explaining the lawyers obliga-
tions in a society characterized by moral pluralism. Finally, 
Part IV introduces the moral conflict of interest standard, ex-
plains how it could operate to cure the deficiencies in both tra-
ditional and social justice models of lawyering, and defends it 
against the criticism that allowing lawyers to abstain from rep-
resenting clients based on moral concerns would eviscerate ac-
cess to justice. 
I.  MORAL PLURALISM 
In a society characterized by moral pluralism, citizens hold 
firmly to moral beliefs derived from a diversity of moral, reli-
gious, and philosophical sources.16 There is no way to reconcile 
the differing moral conceptions because no one comprehensive 
doctrine for determining right from wrong is accepted by all 
citizens.17 John Rawlss 1993 book, Political Liberalism,18 can 
 
 15. See, e.g., Pepper, Lawyers Amoral Role, supra note 3, at 61718 (argu-
ing that social justice should be decided through the processes of law, not by 
individual lawyers acting as moral screens); see also infra notes 5660 and ac-
companying text. 
 16. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 12, at xvi. 
 17. See id. 
 18. RAWLS, supra note 12. 
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be seen as ushering in the modern debate in political philoso-
phy over moral pluralism.19 While a full analysis of Rawlss un-
derstanding of justice as a political concept is beyond the scope 
of this Article,20 his rather striking vision of moral pluralism as 
a normal and desirable state of affairs has interesting implica-
tions for theorists who seek to define the role of the lawyer in a 
just society. 
What is striking about Rawlss view of moral pluralism is 
that it envisions moral pluralism as a natural and inevitable 
development, indeed as the natural outcome of . . . human rea-
son under enduring free institutions.21 To see [moral] plural-
ism as a disaster, Rawls writes, is to see the exercise of rea-
son under the conditions of freedom itself as a disaster.22 
Rather, he views the emergence of a plurality of reasonable yet 
incompatible moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines as 
the mark of a truly free and democratic society in which indi-
viduals are politically able to pursue their own conceptions of 
the good.23 Quite simply, according to Rawls, the divergent and 
uncompromising moral schisms of pluralism must be under-
stood as a sign that liberalism is working the way it should. 
Rather than seeking to cure it, we should understand moral 
pluralism as a natural and permanent feature of modern de-
mocratic societies.24 
How moral pluralism can be explained as a natural and 
permanent condition of free societies is an interesting question. 
Why is it that under conditions of political freedom, individuals 
 
 19. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 
184218 (2d ed. 1998) (responding at length to Rawlss reconceptualization of 
justice around political liberalism); TOMASI, supra note 13, at 9 (describing 
Rawlss political liberalism as a radically new liberal view). 
 20. In Political Liberalism, Rawls posits that principles of justice can be 
accepted as part of an overlapping consensus of minimal commitments that 
all reasonable comprehensive conceptions will share. See RAWLS, supra note 
12, at 13372. Rawlss quest to reformulate his theory of justice on political 
rather than metaphysical grounds continued until his ill health intervened, 
and his last unfinished manuscript was eventually edited by Erin Kelly and 
published in 2001. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT, 
at xiixiii (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). 
 21. RAWLS, supra note 12, at xxiv. 
 22. Id. at xxivxxv. 
 23. See, e.g., id. at xxivxxvi. 
 24. See, e.g., id. at xvi; see also SUSAN MENDUS, IMPARTIALITY IN MORAL 
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1113 (2002) (summarizing Rawlss conclusion 
regarding the inevitability of moral pluralism and arguing that two features of 
the modern world that affect contemporary political philosophy are the per-
manence of pluralism and the significance of religious and moral beliefs). 
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will diverge in their views of what is right and wrong rather 
than converging around a social consensus? What accounts for 
moral differences that run so deep that they cannot be bridged 
through rational argument or empirical investigation? This sec-
tion explores three possible explanations, drawn from political 
and moral philosophy, of how the emergence of a diversity of 
incommensurably different moral viewpoints can be viewed as 
a natural and understandable feature of modern democratic so-
cieties. It then outlines the implications of this view of moral 
pluralism for the role of the lawyer in a morally pluralistic so-
ciety, given the lawyers dual roles as a political agent within a 
system of justice and as an individual possessing an internal 
moral perspective on his or her own moral values as well as the 
moral values of others. 
A. SOURCES OF MORAL PLURALISM 
The explanations advanced by moral and political theorists 
of the sources of moral pluralism can be divided into three dis-
tinct categories.25 One type of explanationthe epistemologi-
cal difficulty explanationunderstands moral reasoning as a 
search for moral truth or moral consistency, which is arrived at 
by applying reason to ones moral intuitions. This view of mo-
rality allows for the existence of universal moral truth, but it 
recognizes the difficulty of actually reaching a correct assess-
ment of that truth. Moral pluralism, under this account, arises 
from the fallibility of human reason. The second type of expla-
nationthe value pluralism explanationunderstands per-
sonal morality as a commitment to a set of core values chosen 
from among a plurality of incommensurable values. Under this 
view, the range of values is simply too broad and diverse to re-
sult in a clear hierarchy of values, and there are multiple right 
choices that one might make in prioritizing them. However, the 
choices any one individual makes in prioritizing values create 
personal commitments that shape that individuals other life  
 
 
 25. Although theoretically distinct, these explanations do not divide lib-
eral theorists into clearly differentiated schools of thought. Indeed, many theo-
rists accept multiple explanations or explanations that are an amalgam of the 
three theoretical types described in this section. See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 
13, at 2838 (describing expressive liberty, value pluralism, and political plu-
ralism as three sources of pluralism with which liberalism must contend); 
RAWLS, supra note 12, at 5658 (providing a list of factors, which overlap all 
three categories, that lead to the creation of a plurality of comprehensive 
moral doctrines). 
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choices and value commitments and that become integral to 
that individuals personal identity. The third type of explana-
tionthe cultural identity and experience explanation
recognizes that persons in society are members of various sub-
cultures and communities, not merely individuals, and that 
their membership in those other communities inevitably shapes 
their values and influences their experiences of the world. 
1. The Epistemological Difficulty Explanation 
The epistemological difficulty explanation is consistent 
with claims that moral truth exists, but it acknowledges the 
difficulty of arriving at correct moral judgments given the 
many factors that come into play in assessing right and wrong 
conduct.26 The epistemological difficulty explanation supposes a 
process of moral reasoning that involves rationalizing ones 
judgments in particular cases into principled explanations for 
those judgments. One leading example of such a process is the 
reflective equilibrium posited by Rawls in his earlier and 
seminal work, A Theory of Justice.27 In the process of reaching 
reflective equilibrium, we begin with moral judgments in par-
ticular situationsjudgments that arise from an intuitive 
sense of justice.28 We generalize these intuitive moral judg-
ments into moral principles that explain the judgments and can 
be applied to other similar situations.29 Our particular moral 
judgments and the more general moral principles then play off 
each other in a process of mutual revision.30 In some cases, we 
revise our intuitive moral judgments to make them consistent 
with our general moral principles.31 In other cases, we revise 
our general moral principles to better account for our intuitive 
moral judgments.32 Eventually we reach a balance between our 
intuitive sense of justice and our rationalized and generalized 
principlesa balance that Rawls calls reflective equilib-
rium.33 
 
 
 26. Rawls calls the many factors that can lead to different moral judg-
ments the burdens of judgment. RAWLS, supra note 12, at 5458. 
 27. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4043 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 28. Id. at 41. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 4243. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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In A Theory of Justice, Rawls wrote that he t[ook] for 
granted that the outcome of this process of reflective equilib-
riumthe principles that characterize one persons considered 
judgmentswould be either approximately the same for per-
sons whose judgments are in reflective equilibrium, or if not, 
that their judgments [would] divide along a few main lines.34 
After recognizing the permanence of reasonable pluralism in 
his later work, Rawls revised that view. In Political Liberalism, 
Rawls explains how, based on a variety of factors relating to 
the fallibility of the process, conscientious and reasonable per-
sons could be expected to differ markedly in their considered 
judgments as well as in the comprehensive doctrines of moral-
ity or religion that explain these judgments.35 The factors relat-
ing to fallibility include the complexity of the evidence that 
bears on a moral issue; the varying weight that different people 
give to different considerations; the existence of difficult cases; 
and the existence of moral conflicts requiring tradeoffs between 
principles, which people may negotiate in different ways.36 
The epistemological difficulty explanation thus allows for 
the existence of moral truth. It is consistent with a view that 
given access to complete information and perfect rationality, 
moral questions are capable of right and wrong answers. The 
problem is that those answers elude our practical human capa-
bilities and thus remain outside of our reach.37 The complexity 
 
 34. Id. at 44. 
 35. RAWLS, supra note 12, at 5658. Rawls admits the fallibility of this 
process, noting that someeven allreasonable results may be false. Id. at 
58. Rawls views the ultimate outcome of this process as the development of a 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine that rationalizes ones moral beliefs. Id. at 
5860. According to Rawls, reasonable comprehensive doctrines express views 
of the world and of our life with one another in more or less consistent and 
coherent systems grounded in moral, philosophical, or religious traditions of 
thought. Id. at 5859. 
 36. Id. at 5657. Rawls notes additional factors that relate to the other 
two explanations of moral pluralism. He refers specifically to Isaiah Berlins 
conception of a plurality of incommensurable values, and he notes that some 
variation will result from the fact that in a modern society with its numerous 
offices and positions, its various divisions of labor, its many social groups and 
their ethnic variety, citizens total experiences are disparate enough for their 
judgments to diverge, at least to some degree, on many if not most cases of any 
significant complexity. Id. at 57. These considerations are discussed infra as 
the value-pluralism explanation and the cultural identity and experience ex-
planation, respectively. 
 37. Lawyering theorist Paul Tremblay has drawn from the psychological 
theory of cognitive bias to illustrate how our beliefs about the world may be 
influenced by our preexisting biases. See Paul R. Tremblay, Client-Centered 
Counseling, Symposium, Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. 
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of the task of moral reasoning, the fallibility of our beliefs, and 
the intricate interplay between our preexisting beliefs and the 
way we view the world combine to create epistemological diffi-
culty in reaching moral certainty. The result is a plurality of 
reasonable moral beliefs. 
2. The Value Pluralism Explanation 
The second explanation for moral pluralism, that of value 
pluralism, arises from the notion that there exists a plurality of 
incommensurable valuessuch as justice, kindness, loyalty, 
fairness, honesty, and the desire to pleasethat cannot be ra-
tionalized into a single, coherent moral system.38 According to 
value pluralists, the task of properly discerning a single princi-
ple that underlies, explains, and reconciles ones moral judg-
ments into an orderly hierarchy is not just difficult and subject 
to error; it is simply not possible.39 The articulation of the idea 
that there is a plurality of incommensurable values is generally 
credited to Isaiah Berlin.40 According to Berlin, conflict be-
tween values is an intrinsic, irremovable element in human 
life.41 
 
L. REV. 615, 61822 (2003). Although Tremblay believes that we basically 
share a deep set of common values and that rational application of our com-
mon moral principles would lead to common results, he notes that we disagree 
about the concrete application of those values in particular situations. See id. 
at 618. Because of biases deeply embedded in the way we process information, 
he contends, we resist the factual inquiry that might resolve what appears to 
be moral difference because we tend to find fault with the reliability of infor-
mation that contradicts our preexisting biases and tend to be convinced by in-
formation that supports our preexisting views. See id. at 62223. 
 38. See, e.g., STUART HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT 2022 (1983). 
 39. See id. at 12 ([T]he underlying structure of ones moral beliefs . . . is 
something that one may look for and yet may fail to find, not only because one 
is not ingenious enough to find it, but perhaps also because it may not be there 
to be found.). 
 40. E.g., GALSTON, supra note 13, at 45 (The concluding section of Ber-
lins Two Concepts of Liberty has helped spark what may now be regarded as 
a full-fledged value-pluralist movement in contemporary moral philosophy.); 
see also ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in LIB-
ERTY 166, 21617 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) [hereinafter BERLIN, TWO CON-
CEPTS]. Berlin himself traces its roots to nineteenth-century Romantic ideal-
ism. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED 
TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 1, 24 (Henry 
Hardy ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (1990) [hereinafter BERLIN, The Pur-
suit of the Ideal]. For other theories that draw support for liberalism out of 
value pluralism, see, for example, GALSTON, supra note 13; HAMPSHIRE, su-
pra note 38; and JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
 41. BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS, supra note 40, at 21213. 
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Value pluralists claim the existence of many kinds of life 
in which humans can thrive as a fact about human nature, 
rejecting ideals of human perfection based on one conception of 
the good life.42 According to value pluralists, it is not possible 
to order ones life around all positive values because there is a 
moral scarcity . . . built into the fabric of human life43 and no 
common currency with which positive values can be compared 
or traded off against one another.44 For example, situations 
may arise that require one to choose between loyalty to ones 
friend and fairness to others, or between being truthful and be-
ing kind.45 A rationalist would say that there are right answers 
in these circumstances and that the trick is figuring out the 
complex hierarchy among values as it plays out in particular 
situations.46 A value pluralist, however, would view these kinds 
of situations as requiring individuals to choose between com-
peting and incommensurable values.47 
According to the value pluralists, individuals define their 
life goals, and even their personal identities, through the proc-
ess of committing themselves to certain core values that subse-
quently shape their other goals and choices.48 A persons 
choices may not be made directly, but instead may arise 
through situations in which he or she experiences conflicting 
values and must choose between them.49 The result of the sur-
 
 42. GRAY, supra note 13, at 910. 
 43. Id. at 10. 
 44. See, e.g., HAMPSHIRE, supra note 38, at 155. This is generally what is 
meant by the notion of the incommensurability of values. See, e.g., RAZ, su-
pra note 40, at 32166 (discussing the notion of incommensurability). 
 45. E.g., HAMPSHIRE, supra note 38, at 37. 
 46. See supra notes 3537 and accompanying text. 
 47. This is not to say that there is never a clearly superior answer when 
values come into conflict. Value pluralists generally concede a core of values 
that must be present to make any human life worthwhile. Joseph Raz calls 
these biologically determined needs and desires, such as health or the need 
for food. RAZ, supra note 40, at 290. Likewise, Stuart Hampshire asserts, 
against arguments for relativism, that there are certain essential virtues. 
HAMPSHIRE, supra note 38, at 37. Among these essential virtues, he lists 
courage, fairness or justice, loyalty, love and friendship, intelligence and skill, 
and some self-control. Id. 
 48. Raz distinguishes human goals that are subject to choice from those 
that are biologically determined. RAZ, supra note 40, at 29091. According to 
Raz, human goals are hierarchically arrangedor nested within hierarchical 
structuresso that the more fundamental or important goals help to shape 
the subsidiary goals that will lead to the attainment of the higher goals. See 
id. at 29293. 
 49. See, e.g., HAMPSHIRE, supra note 38, at 3143; see also RAZ, supra 
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plus of incommensurable positive values and the myriad of 
choices that individuals make in ordering these values in their 
life choices is a plurality of different value systems. These sys-
tems may be in conflict with one another, creating a plurality of 
reasonable yet ultimately incompatible moral views. 
3. The Cultural Identity and Experience Explanation 
While the value pluralists tend to view incommensurable- 
value conflict as a condition of human nature, the third expla-
nation for moral pluralism situates value differences more spe-
cifically within the cultural identities and personal experiences 
of individuals.50 According to the cultural identity and experi-
ence explanation, ones choice of values is not simply an indi-
vidual commitment to be a certain kind of person, but is rather 
an outgrowth and expression of ones cultural identity. Andrea 
Baumeister has noted the parallel between moral pluralism 
and the political demands of various religious, ethnic, and na-
tional minorities within multicultural democracies.51 The cul-
turally based values in minority communities hold a special 
status within a larger society because they define a way of life 
that has normative authority for members in those communi-
ties in ways that go beyond individual members value 
choices.52 
 
note 40, at 29091 (Some . . . goals a person may have adopted deliberately, 
some he may have chosen. Others he may have drifted into, grown up with, 
never realized that anyone can fail to have them, etc.). 
 50. The insight that different cultures have developed values in different 
ways was an important source of the value pluralists rejection of a unity or 
harmony of values as a matter of human nature. See, e.g., BERLIN, The Pursuit 
of the Ideal, supra note 40, at 1011 (tracing his own views on value pluralism 
to the eighteenth-century writer Johann Gottfried Herders recognition of 
variations in the centre of gravity of different cultures regarding ends). 
 51. BAUMEISTER, supra note 13, at 13, 16 (comparing the challenges that 
national and ethnic minorities pose for liberalism to the challenge posed by 
early value pluralists). Baumeisters work tests the adequacies of the various 
theoretical responses to moral pluralism within liberal theories against the 
demands for political inclusion of religious, ethnic, and national minorities, as 
well as feminist critiques of classical liberalism. See generally BAUMEISTER, 
supra note 13; Andrea T. Baumeister, Multicultural Citizenship, Identity and 
Conflict, in TOLERATION, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 13, at 87. 
 52. See, e.g., Bhikhu Parekh, The Logic of Intercultural Evaluation, in 
TOLERATION, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 13, at 163, 163. The rec-
ognition of minority-community values creates special political tensions be-
cause it implicates issues of group rights and cultural survival, which are dif-
ficult to fit within the liberal focus on individualism and individual autonomy. 
See id. at 16364. 
KRUSE_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:54:58 AM 
402 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:389 
 
Ones status as a member of an outsider community due to 
ones race, class, sex, experience of disability, or sexual orienta-
tion can also produce different experiences of social life that af-
fect the development of ones values.53 Outsider perspectives 
can embody deep value differences, illustrated famously by 
Carol Gilligans assertion that in contrast to the justice ethic 
exemplified by traditional rationalist moral theory, women 
have developed an ethic of caring based on maintaining rela-
tionships.54 Additionally, outsider perspectives can contribute 
to widely differing understandings of many factual situations, 
which can lead to differing moral outlooks over a range of moral 
and social issues.55 
Although the three foregoing explanations of the sources of 
moral pluralism are not fully consistent with each other, they 
need not be seen as mutually exclusive. Each of the explana-
tions of the sources of moral pluralism can be viewed as being 
accurate to some degree. For example, when we reflect on our 
moral beliefs, attempting to justify them to ourselves or per-
haps to others, we go through a process something like Rawlss 
reflective equilibrium. We also have certain core values to 
which we are committed, and these values shape our subse-
quent life choices. Finally, our perspectives on the world, both 
in terms of how we judge facts and how we prioritize values, 
are affected by our social situation and cultural upbringing. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL ETHICS MODELS OF LAWYERING 
Accepting these explanations of the sources of moral plu-
ralism as more or less accurate, two important points for 
 
 53. Sylvia Lazos Vargas has called these different ways of perceiving so-
cial phenomena differing epistemologies that operate by virtue of ones 
membership in majority or minority groups. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, De-
mocracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of the Judge in a Pluralist 
Polity, 58 MD. L. REV. 150, 155 n.13 (1999). The recognition that outsiders 
have different perspectives has generated a whole genre of outsider jurispru-
dence to juxtapose the seemingly objective perspectives embodied in the law 
with the differing perspectives of outgroup members. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. 
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMOD-
ERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 15862 (2000) (discussing the connections 
between outsider jurisprudence and postmodern thought). 
 54. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL THEORY AND WOMENS DEVELOPMENT (1982). Whether outsider perspec-
tives are an appropriate basis for a full-blown alternative moral theory is con-
troversial, since by nature they arise out of the experience of being oppressed. 
 55. For a discussion of the various forces that create different perspec-
tives, see, for example, Lazos Vargas, supra note 53, at 18496. 
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lawyering theory follow. One conclusion, typically drawn by po-
litical philosophers, is to emphasize the importance of societal 
tolerance of different moral viewpoints and of political neutral-
ity between competing conceptions of the good.56 This conclu-
sion follows from both rationalist and value-pluralist accounts. 
It follows from the rationalist view of the fallibility of our moral 
beliefs that no one persons or groups conception of morality is 
necessarily right, and that the best approximation of what is 
right for society will come from allowing maximum freedom 
and diversity of beliefs to thrive.57 Likewise, it follows from a 
value-pluralist perspective that if persons differing value 
choices can be equally legitimate, and if living according to 
those beliefs, once chosen, is central to their human flourishing, 
then the imposition of political constraints on the exercise of 
those beliefs is a particularly intrusive exercise of state author-
ity into individual autonomy.58  
 Because the lawyer is a political actor, playing a role 
within a larger system of justice, the use of his or her profes-
sional role to impose his or her personal morality in ways that 
silence opposing moral viewpoints or frustrate individual 
autonomy on moral grounds has been problematic for lawyering 
theory.59 The focus of much of the recent discussion in legal 
ethics that addresses moral pluralism has been on this political 
 
 56. Although this statement describes the general conclusion of liberal 
political theory, there is significant internal debate among liberal political 
theorists about the limits of political neutrality between competing concep-
tions of the good. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 19 (exploring the possibilities 
for applying justice in a neutral way in a society characterized by moral plu-
ralism). 
 57. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 13, at 3 (For liberal thinkers who sought a 
rational consensus on the best life, toleration was a remedy for the limitations 
of human understanding. . . . It was this manifest imperfection of human rea-
son that underpinned the ideal of toleration as a means to consensus.); JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 88 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale 
Univ. Press 2003) (1859) (arguing that our fallibility about right and wrong 
should justify tolerance for freedom of expression of a variety of viewpoints 
and that [a]ll silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility). 
 58. See generally RAZ, supra note 40 (discussing the responsibilities of 
government in creating and promoting freedom, and arguing for a political 
theory of freedom and tolerance based in the assumptions of value pluralism).  
 59. For example, Pepper argues that it is inappropriate for a lawyers per-
sonal moral beliefs to perform the public function of denying access to the law. 
See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 657, 66566 (The lawyer, unlike the spouse or 
friend, is part of the formal system of law imposed by the community . . . and 
therefore has different obligations from those of the spouse or friend.). 
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role that lawyers play.60 What has received less attention are 
the implications of moral pluralism for the internal moral per-
spective of the individual lawyerthat is, how the lawyer is 
likely to view his or her own moral beliefs and the beliefs of 
others, and how that perspective affects his or her lawyering.61  
 As this section demonstrates, three features of our internal 
experience of morality follow from the political and moral theo-
rists explanations of the sources of moral pluralism. First, we 
have a strong tendency to view our own moral beliefs as true. 
Second, we tend to view the moral beliefs of those with whom 
we disagree as mistaken. Finally, we experience a significant 
betrayal of self if we fail to act in accordance with our moral 
values. This Article later argues that the impact of this internal 
moral perspective poses serious challenges to a lawyer attempt-
ing to represent clients with whom the lawyer fundamentally 
morally disagrees. 
It follows from the process of something like Rawlss re-
flective equilibrium that when we have reached considered 
moral judgments, we have a strong tendency to view these 
judgments as true. This is because from our internal perspec-
tives, we have explained our moral judgments to ourselves and 
made them rationally consistent with our other beliefs. Our 
considered judgments fit together into larger systems of beliefs 
that make sense to us and provide us with a satisfactory way of 
determining right from wrongsatisfactory enough that we are 
willing to invest it with great and overriding value in our own 
lives. The fact that we have gone through this process and 
reached this result gives our moral judgments a kind of truth 
value for us.62 Moreover, because we have grounded our beliefs 
in generalizable principles, we understand our moral beliefs as 
 
 60. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 14; Morgan & Tuttle, supra note 14; 
Wendel, supra note 10. 
 61. But cf. Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyers Point of 
View, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 209 (2003) (describing from a moral phenome-
nological perspective how lawyers view their participation in professionally 
sanctioned activities that violate the dictates of ordinary morality). 
 62. See, e.g., Peter Jones, Beliefs and Identities, in TOLERATION, IDENTITY 
AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 13, at 65, 81 (To hold a belief is to hold that 
something is the case. It is not to declare this is who I am. [sic]); id. at 82 
([M]y commitment to what I believe cannot be primarily a commitment to an 
identity; it must be a commitment to the truth or the rightness of what I be-
lieve.); cf. MENDUS, supra note 24, at 75 (noting that when we decide to act on 
the basis of values that form a core part of our personal identities, we do not 
do so out of care for our identities but out of care for the things that we value). 
KRUSE_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:54:58 AM 
2005] CHALLENGE OF MORAL PLURALISM 405 
 
being true not only for us, but true for other people as well.63 
We may recognize that other people disagree with us about 
what is morally right and wrong, but from our internal per-
spectives, we do not think that such disagreement places them 
beyond the reach of moral rules. 
From the internal perspective, there is a strong tendency 
to view conflicting moral beliefs as involving moral or factual 
mistakes. In other words, because we recognize the fallibility of 
the process, we easily believe that it is possible to make moral 
mistakes. However, it is much easier for us to believe that oth-
ers have erred than it is to believe in our own errors regarding 
moral judgments. As John Stuart Mill writes, [F]ew think it 
necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, 
or admit . . . that any opinion, of which they feel very certain, 
may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowl-
edge themselves to be liable.64 Our social standings, whether 
as insiders or outsiders, can further contribute to the belief that 
others are simply morally mistaken. If I experience the world 
from the perspective of the dominant culture, that culture will 
reflect my perspective to such a large extent that it may be dif-
ficult for me to realize the ways in which my perspective is not 
universally shared.65 On the other hand, if I experience the 
world from an outsider perspective, I will be quite aware that 
the assumptions of the dominant culture are at variance with 
my perspective, and this knowledge may lead me to discount 
the judgments of members of the dominant culture. 
 
 63. See, e.g., R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND 
POINT 10716 (1981) (arguing that the property of universalizability is inher-
ent in the use of moral imperatives); MARCUS GEORGE SINGER, GENERALIZA-
TION IN ETHICS: AN ESSAY IN THE LOGIC OF ETHICS, WITH THE RUDIMENTS OF 
A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 34 (Atheneum 1971) (1961) (arguing that 
generalization is at the heart of moral reasoning because it is presupposed 
in every attempt to give a reason for a moral judgment). 
 64. MILL, supra note 57, at 88. Our sense of the fallibility of others may 
only be increased by a consciousness that what we believe to be factually true 
about the world does not seem to match the factual predicates on which differ-
ing moral views are based. For example, if my beliefs are based on facts about 
the world as I perceive it, I may view those who reach different moral judg-
ments as being simply ill informed. I will perhaps think that if they had cor-
rect information, they would come to the same moral judgment that I have 
reached. 
 65. See, e.g., HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING 10516 (1995) (discuss-
ing the phenomenon of white people not seeing themselves as having a race); 
Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, PEACE & 
FREEDOM, July/Aug. 1989, at 10 (describing the effect of whiteness in shaping 
her experience of the world), reprinted in INDEP. SCH., Winter 1990, at 31. 
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Because our personal moral commitments play such an 
important role in shaping our lives and personal identities, act-
ing contrary to our moral values engenders a sense of personal 
failure and special regret, even if that failure is due to circum-
stances outside of our control.66 Once chosen or articulated 
through life decisions, achieving a life consistent with our val-
ues becomes an important part of our personal identitiesor, 
in the words of Bernard Williams, the nexus of ground pro-
jects that give shape and meaning to our lives.67 As Williams 
writes, loss or frustration of our ground projects would re-
move meaning from life in an important respect, such that we 
may feel that we might as well have died.68 Rawls writes in a 
similar vein that [i]f we suddenly lost [our conceptions of the 
good], we would be disoriented and unable to carry on, and if 
we were to change them suddenly, as in the case of a religious 
conversion, we [would be] likely to say that we are no longer 
the same person.69 Even if we could have chosen different pro-
jects at some point in time, the success of our chosen projects is 
ultimately deeply connected with our personal well-being.70 
This picture of our internal moral experiences is not in-
tended to convey the idea that we can never get outside of our 
own moral perspectives. Indeed, tools such as empathy can help 
us to appreciate diverse cultural and moral perspectives in a 
 
 66. Significantly, value pluralists admit the existence of moral dilem-
massituations in which ones values come into irreconcilable conflict that 
require one to make an immoral choice. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 40, at 359
66; BERNARD WILLIAMS, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 
19731980, at 20, 31 (1981). In a moral system in which right answers can 
be found, most notably utilitarian theories, it is difficult to explain the exis-
tence of the moral regret, or even despair, that such situations create. How-
ever, this inability to explain a moral phenomenon that we experience has 
been taken as a criticism of those theories. For a fuller discussion of the phe-
nomenon of agent regret in lawyering, see Markovits, supra note 61. 
 67. See WILLIAMS, supra note 66, at 3339 (discussing the relationship of 
ground projects to morality); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Persons, Character and 
Morality, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 19731980, supra note 66, 
at 1, 1214 (discussing the nexus of ground projects that give meaning to a 
persons life); see also RAWLS, supra note 12, at 31 (describing a persons moral 
commitments as specify[ing] moral identity and giv[ing] shape to a persons 
way of life); RAZ, supra note 40, at 31320 (discussing the relationship be-
tween morality and personal well-being). 
 68. WILLIAMS, supra note 67, at 13. 
 69. RAWLS, supra note 12, at 31. Although Rawls is not a value pluralist, 
he acknowledges the possibility of value pluralism as one potential source of 
moral pluralism. See supra note 36. 
 70. E.g., RAZ, supra note 40, at 29499. 
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way that transcends mere toleration and approaches true re-
spect. However, despite our ability to transcend our own inter-
nal moral perspectives, it is not an easy task. As Thomas Nagel 
notes, [W]e cant fully take on . . . skepticism . . . toward our 
own beliefs while were having them.71 We can affirm tolera-
tion of, and even respect for, diverse moral views as a political 
ideal. Yet, when confronted with a moral viewpoint sharply dif-
ferent from our own on a subject that matters to us, or when 
asked to assist another in actions that we view as immoral, our 
own considered moral beliefs have a strong hold on us. 
The lawyer must thus toe a delicate line. As a political ac-
tor, the lawyer is charged to be neutral between competing le-
gitimate moral perspectives. On the other hand, the lawyer is 
also an individual who is subject to the limitations of an inter-
nal moral perspective from which he or she tends to view his or 
her own moral beliefs as correct and vitally important, and 
from which he or she tends to view fundamentally differing 
moral beliefs as mistaken. As the next sections show, the ten-
sions between the internal moral perspective of the lawyer and 
the political task of lawyering pose problems for both the tradi-
tional and the social justice models of lawyering. This Article 
explores these tensions by applying both traditional and social 
justice lawyering models to a hypothetical lawyer-client rela-
tionship characterized by deep and incommensurable moral di-
vision. 
C. LAWYERING IN A WORLD OF MORAL PLURALISM: LESBIAN 
FAMILY PLANNING AS A CASE STUDY 
No other issue in contemporary American society illus-
trates fundamental moral division better than the divergence 
in moral beliefs about homosexuality.72 That is the conclusion 
of sociologist Alan Wolfe, whose extensive study of middle-class 
moral values concluded, in part, that the question of homo-
sexuality reveals two genuinely different moral camps in Amer-
ica that disagree profoundly about the fundamental nature of 
what they are contesting.73 Wolfe asserts that moral differ-
 
 71. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 88 (1986). 
 72. ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL 72 (1998). 
 73. Id. at 79. Wolfes Middle Class Morality Project involved interviewing 
two hundred residents of eight geographically and demographically diverse 
suburbs. See id. at 2130. These interviews were designed to explore issues 
that were thought to divide middle-class Americans in a culture war between 
American liberals and conservatives in order to test the hypothesis that mid-
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ences over homosexuality may well be the kind of differences 
that test the limits of middle-class moral tolerance in a way 
that cannot be talked out.74 
To demonstrate and test the efficacy of lawyering models in 
the face of moral pluralism, this Article applies the traditional 
model and three alternative social justice models of lawyering 
to a hypothetical lawyer-client relationship involving the divi-
sive issue of homosexual parenting. The clients are a lesbian 
couple who wish to have a child together, either through adop-
tion or alternative methods of conception. The lawyer, however, 
believes that a homosexual lifestyle is morally wrong and 
harmful to children. Viewed from the moral perspective of the 
lawyer, this lawyer-client relationship incorporates all the ele-
ments of a standard professional responsibility hypothetical: 
the clients want to use the law to promote an immoral end, the 
law arguably allows them to do it, and their actions will visit 
harm on an innocent third party. By situating these familiar 
elements within a moral framework in which there is no moral 
consensus and little ground for moral compromise, it is possible 
to explore the challenges that moral pluralism poses for both 
traditional and social justice lawyering models. 
 
dle-class Americans no longer share a common moral worldview but are bit-
terly divided into traditionalist and modernist wings. Id. at 21. Wolfe ulti-
mately concluded that [o]n moral matters, there is no unanimity in America. 
Id. at 276. On a number of issues such as respect for homosexuality, support 
for postmodern families, [and] sympathy toward immigration, the Project re-
vealed that middle-class Americans were strongly divided into different 
camps. Id. However, rather than being locked in a culture war that divided 
one group of Americans and another, the Project concluded that the real di-
vide was between sets of values important to everyone. Id. at 279. While rec-
ognizing the strong divisions in moral values that characterize American soci-
ety, the Project found middle-class Americans to be tolerant to a fault, 
moderate in their outlook on the world, and reluctant to impose values they 
understand as virtuous for themselves on others. Id. at 278. 
 74. Id. at 81. In an interesting sense, Rawls is exploring the philosophical 
foundations for the situation observed by Wolfe: the development of values of 
tolerance in the face of sharp moral disagreement. See generally RAWLS, supra 
note 12. As others have noted, the puzzle of tolerance despite moral heteroge-
neity is a central issue for Rawlss political liberalism. See, e.g., TOMASI, supra 
note 13, at 9 (Political liberalism, insofar as it starts with anything, starts 
with a very general idea of societysomething like the idea of a moral union, 
or democratic agreement, in the face of reasonable pluralism.); John Horton 
& Susan Mendus, Toleration, Identity and Difference, in TOLERATION, IDEN-
TITY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 13, at 1, 23. Indeed, the central question 
Rawls explores is how there may exist over time a stable and just society of 
free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. RAWLS, supra note 12, at xviii. 
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The hypothetical that this Article proposes includes the fol-
lowing facts: Tina and Donna, the clients, are a lesbian couple. 
Although they do not live in a jurisdiction that allows them to 
marry, they have done everything they can do legally to put 
their property into joint ownership so that their property rights 
duplicate those of a married couple. Tina and Donna want to 
have a child together, either through adoption or artificial in-
semination. They are seeking advice on how to use existing law 
to structure their family so that their child can have a family 
relationship that best approximates the kind of relationship the 
child would have if Tina and Donna were legally married. They 
believesomewhat naively, as we shall seethat they will be 
able to arrange their parenting rights in much the same way 
that they have arranged their property rights.  
Tina and Donna seek legal advice from Rex, a family law 
and probate lawyer who has been practicing for thirty years. 
Rex is well versed in the law of his jurisdiction and is some-
what familiar with the laws of other jurisdictions in his areas of 
practice. He has what he would characterize as traditional fam-
ily values: he believes it is in the best interests of children to be 
raised in two-parent families, with one mother and one father, 
so that children can have the benefits of stable marital families 
and dual-gender role modeling. Based on his religious tradition 
and moral upbringing, he believes that homosexuality is sinful 
and wrong. He also believes that it can be emotionally and psy-
chologically harmful to children to be exposed to a homosexual 
lifestyle. 
If Tina and Donna were a married couple, their relation-
ships with their child would be legally symmetrical whether the 
child was born into the marriage or adopted by them. When a 
child is born into a heterosexual marriage, the parental rela-
tionships are secured by legal presumptions that make the 
rights of the husband legally symmetrical to those of the wife,75 
and even prefer his legal parenthood over the paternal claims 
of a man who is known to have actually provided the childs ge-
netic material through intercourse or sperm donation.76 This 
 
 75. A biological mothers legal parenthood is usually established by the 
act of childbearing, without more. Paternity is usually established by showing 
a biological and care-giving connection to a child or by demonstrating that a 
marital relationship existed between the childs mother and supposed father 
at the time the child was conceived. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual 
Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 691
93 (2001). 
 76. See id. The legally presumed parenthood of a husband may override 
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preference for the husbands paternity is consistent with a 
range of laws and policies dictating that every child should 
have one mother and one father, neither more nor less,77 cou-
pled with a desire to protect the sanctity of the marital fam-
ily.78 
Tina and Donnas options for duplicating this set of legally 
symmetrical parental rights incident to marriage may be slim 
or nonexistent, depending on the law in their jurisdiction. The 
marital presumptions that create legally symmetrical parental 
relationships between married partners are probably unavail-
able to them.79 Unless the adoption statute in their jurisdiction 
is construed to permit co-parent or second-parent adoption,80 
 
the parental claims of a nonmarried biological father. See Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., 491 U.S. 110, 12327 (1989) (rejecting the argument of a childs biological 
father that his biological relationship plus the parenting relationship he had 
established with the child created a liberty interest sufficient to override Cali-
fornias conclusive presumption that the mothers husband was the legal fa-
ther of the child). Even if the wife has been artificially inseminated with 
sperm donated by another man, state statutes may presume that her husband 
is the legal father of the child. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 2004) (If, 
under the supervision of a licensed physician and surgeon and with the con-
sent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a 
man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural 
father of a child thereby conceived.). 
 77. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining 
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-
traditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 468 (1990); see also id. at 46873 (trac-
ing the preference for the one-father/one-mother definition of parenthood 
through several legal doctrines). 
 78. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 12327 (upholding a state law creating a 
presumption of paternity in the husband and relying in significant part on the 
historical respect for the marital family). 
 79. Barring the intervention of sophisticated reproductive technology, 
only one of them can be the biological parent of the child. Moreover, in most 
jurisdictions only one of them can be the adoptive parent. William B. Ruben-
stein, Divided We Propagate: An Introduction to Protecting Families: Stan-
dards for Child Custody in Same-Sex Relationships, 10 UCLA WOMENS L.J. 
143, 145 (1999) ([S]econd parent adoptions remain the exception . . . as they 
are approved in only a handful of states . . . .). 
 80. In the handful of states that have recognized co-parent or second-
parent adoptions for same-sex couples, the authority is rarely granted explic-
itly in the statute. Annette R. Appell, Lesbian and Gay Adoption, ADOPTION 
Q., 2001, at 75, 78 [hereinafter Appell, Lesbian and Gay Adoption I] (Con-
necticut is the only state, to my knowledge, with an adoption act that specifi-
cally permits non-marital co-parent adoption . . . .). Rather, courts have in-
ferred such authority by interpreting statutory language using a best 
interests of the child standard. See id. at 8081. In updating her review of 
lesbian and gay adoption law in 2003, Annette Appell noted that three state 
statutes explicitly permitted second-parent adoptions, adding California and 
Vermont to the tally. Annette R. Appell, Recent Developments in Lesbian and 
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Tinas and Donnas parental rights will be legally asymmetri-
cal: one of them will be the legal parent of the child by birth or 
adoption, and the other will be considered by law to be a third 
party without the protections incident to legal parenthooda 
legal stranger[] to the child.81 
Although Tina and Donna have likely discussed some of 
their options with each other before arriving at Rexs office, in-
formation about the legal dimensions of the situation will un-
doubtedly raise the questions in ways that they have not an-
ticipated and with which they will have to struggle. Rex will 
have to advise them what the law permits them to do; inform 
them of the legal obstacles that stand in their way; and help 
them assess what they want to do in light of those legal oppor-
tunities and barriers, as well as in light of their own moral 
commitments and beliefs. 
The sections that follow explore how the traditional model 
and various social justice models of lawyering would approach 
Rexs legal representation of Tina and Donna. Each model 
would define the justice issues involved in the representation in 
a slightly different manner. Yet in each of the models, the goals 
of justice that the model defines would be frustrated by the rec-
ognition of moral pluralism and what such recognition entails 
for the competing political obligations and the individual inter-
nal moral perspective of the lawyer. 
II.  THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF LAWYERING 
The traditional model of lawyering initially appears to re-
spond well to the question of lawyering in a society character-
ized by moral pluralism because it defines the lawyers profes-
sional duties to the client from a perspective of moral neutrality 
toward the clients objectives. While the professions aspiration 
to provide legal assistance to clients regardless of any particu-
lar moral judgment of the clients ends is defensible in a mor-
ally pluralistic society, the ability of the individual lawyer to 
deliver legal assistance free of moral judgment is questionable. 
Because the lawyer operates from within the bounds of his or 
her own internal moral perspective, his or her ability to achieve 
the traditionalists goal of maximizing client autonomy within 
 
Gay Adoption Law, ADOPTION Q., 2003, at 73, 7374, 82 n.3. However, other 
states have moved in the opposite direction, specifically banning adoption by 
homosexual parents. See id. at 7475, 81. 
 81. Polikoff, supra note 77, at 511. 
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the limits of the law would be compromised if the lawyer were 
to accept representation of a client with whom he or she fun-
damentally morally disagreed. As this section shows, despite 
the aspirations of the traditional model to moral transcendence, 
the lawyers internal perspective on morality and justice neces-
sarily comes into play in many cases of routine legal represen-
tation. 
A. JUSTICE AND MORAL TRANSCENDENCE 
For traditionalists, justice is defined through the ideals of 
individual liberty, diversity, and autonomy.82 According to tra-
ditionalists, lawyers serve the ends of justice by making legal 
representation available so that citizens can exercise their 
autonomy to pursue any end permitted by law.83 As Stephen 
Pepper has argued, for the system of justice to operate prop-
erly, citizens need lawyers to provide access to the law in or-
der to pursue their objectives in an increasingly complex sys-
tem of legal regulation.84 In a frequently cited analogy, Pepper 
likens the law to a very large and very complicated machine 
that is theoretically available to the public, but that cannot be 
put to use without the assistance of a skilled mechanic.85 
Under the traditional model, it is not the lawyers role to 
pass moral judgment on the aims of the client, nor is it the law-
yers duty to evaluate the substantive justice of the clients 
cause. Rather, the lawyer owes the client a professional duty to 
advance the clients interests under the limits set by law, and 
the lawyers performance of that duty within the context of the 
adversary system is said to ensure social justice. This amoral 
 
 82. See, e.g., Pepper, Lawyers Amoral Role, supra note 3, at 61618. In 
defending the traditional model, Pepper notes that liberty and autonomy are 
a moral good, that free choice is better than constraint, [and] that each of us 
wishes, to the extent possible, to make our own choices rather than to have 
them made for us. Id. at 61617. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 617. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 617, 62021. Charles Fried, in a similar vein, has ar-
gued that lawyers can be morally conceptualized as special purpose friends 
who are justified in preferring the interests of their particular clients over the 
collective interests of society. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 107173 (1976). 
 85. Pepper, Lawyers Amoral Role, supra note 3, at 62324. Pepper ex-
plores this analogy further in later articles, using the notions of law as a pub-
lic good and the lawyers role as providing access to the law to delineate the 
limits of the advice that lawyers can give clients under a legal realist notion 
of law as encompassing enforcement policies as well as written rules. See, e.g., 
Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 3. 
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role as a neutral advocate is morally defensible, Pepper ar-
gues, because it ensures that the equality and autonomy of citi-
zens within a system governed by the rule of law will not be 
compromised by the moral judgments of an oligarchy of law-
yers.86 Any conflict created between this advocacy role and the 
lawyers fidelity to his or her own moral commitments is viewed 
as a conflict between the lawyers professional duties as a client 
representative and the lawyers autonomy. Hence, the choice of 
the lawyer to refuse to provide professional services on moral 
grounds is seen as a self-indulgent choice to prefer the lawyers 
personal interests over his or her professional duties.87  
The traditional lawyer, concerned primarily with promot-
ing his or her clients autonomy within the limits of the law, 
must therefore be committed to limiting any interference of his 
or her moral perspective with client decision making by tran-
scending his or her own internal moral perspective. On a theo-
retical level, moral transcendence is accomplished by positing a 
vision of the lawyer as a legal technician. On a more practical 
level, moral transcendence is actualized through two possible 
strategies: moral detachment and nonjudgmental empathy. 
This section examines the vision of the lawyer as a legal techni-
cian, the persistence of that vision despite its recognized insta-
bility, and the difficulties with the strategies of moral detach-
ment and empathy in the face of fundamental moral 
disagreement. 
1. The Traditional Lawyer as a Legal Technician 
The traditional model is supported by a vision of the law-
yer as a legal technician, in which the lawyers moral, political, 
or religious beliefs are viewed as irrelevant to the nature or 
quality of the legal representation that the lawyer provides.88 
 
 86. Pepper, Lawyers Amoral Role, supra note 3, at 61519. 
 87. See id. at 632 (describing the refusal of lawyers to accept representa-
tion on moral grounds as a kind of professional conscientious objection that 
always remains an alternative but that should be limited to extreme 
cases). 
 88. Following Sanford Levinson, David Wilkins calls this vision of lawyer-
ing bleached out professionalism. David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: 
Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1504 
(1998) (citing Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on 
the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1578 
(1993)). Wilkins describes bleached out professionalism as central to the 
dominant model of American legal ethics, id. at 1504, and as allowing mem-
bers of the profession to believe that differences among lawyers that might 
matter outside the professional sphere are irrelevant when evaluating the pro-
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The lawyers professional expertise, defined in the professional 
rule governing the duty of competence,89 consists of knowing 
the relevant law and applicable procedures and being able to 
apply them to the facts that the client brings to the lawyer in a 
particular case.90 Because legal expertise is viewed as technical 
in nature, any lawyer is assumed to be able to provide legal 
representation in a relatively consistent manner to any client. 
Professional ethical standards reveal some cracks in the 
facade of this traditional vision of the lawyer as a legal techni-
cian, suggesting that moral considerations may play a role in 
legal representation. The adoption of an exception to the duty 
to take court-appointed cases based on the lawyers personal 
repugnance can be seen as a limited recognition that legal rep-
resentation may be impaired if the lawyer strongly disagrees 
with the clients objectives.91 Likewise, the rule governing the 
lawyer as advisor permits the lawyer to refer to considera-
tions outside the lawsuch as moral, economic, social and po-
litical factorsin executing his or her duty to render candid 
advice92 based on the recognition that legal and moral issues 
may be intertwined with legal representation.93 
However, despite this limited recognition that lawyering 
may involve recourse to moral considerations, the traditional 
model of lawyering does not view the lawyers moral viewpoints 
as an obstacle to effective legal representation. Accordingly, the 
lawyer is free to accept or decline a case based on his or her 
personal preferenceswhether those preferences spring from  
 
 
fessional practices of lawyers, id. at 1505. 
 89. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002). 
 90. Competent representation is definedlargely in cognitive termsas 
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably neces-
sary for the representation. Id. The commentary to the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (Model Rules) elaborates that competence requires the lawyer 
to possess the ability to analyze precedent, evaluate evidence, and spot legal 
issues, and even permits the lawyer to gain competence in a wholly novel 
field in the course of representing a client by engaging in necessary study 
and association with more experienced lawyers in that field. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2. 
 91. The Model Rules permit lawyers to decline appointment if the client 
or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-
lawyer relationship or the lawyers ability to represent the client. Id. R. 6.2(c). 
 92. Id. R. 2.1. 
 93. The comment to the rule notes that [a]lthough a lawyer is not a moral 
advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal 
questions, and that [p]urely technical legal advice . . . can sometimes be in-
adequate. Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2. 
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financial self-interest or personal belief that the clients cause 
is just94and the lawyer is shielded from any presumption that 
his or her decision to take a particular case reflects his or her 
personal beliefs.95 Even the lawyers role in providing moral 
advice remains closely tethered to the vision of the lawyer as a 
legal technician, as the lawyer is cautioned not to stretch the 
boundaries of his or her professional expertise when other more 
qualified professionals are available to deal with the clients 
nonlegal concerns.96 
2. Strategies of Moral Transcendence: Detachment and 
Empathy 
As lawyering theorists note, the lawyer is an individual 
with moral beliefs that may conflict with the dictates of his or 
her professional duties under the traditional model, and practi-
cal strategies are thus needed for transcending the impact of 
those moral beliefs on professional activities. Gerald Postema 
has famously argued that lawyers operating under the tradi-
tional model have strong incentives to employ strategies of 
moral detachment, distancing themselves personally from their 
professional role.97 Morally detached lawyers distance them-
selves from the legal arguments they make, from their own 
judgments of the justness of their clients causes, and from 
their clients moral personalities.98 According to Postema, the  
 
 
 94. Lawyers motivated primarily by personal profit, for example, may 
choose to represent morally repugnant clients who will pay them handsomely 
while choosing to decline representation of needy clients on grounds of moral 
repugnance. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: RE-
FORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 59 (2000) ([T]he bars rhetorical commit-
ments to the unpopular have functioned most often to justify representing the 
disreputable wealthy, not the discreditable indigent.). 
 95. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2002) (A lawyers repre-
sentation of a client . . . does not constitute an endorsement of the clients po-
litical, economic, social or moral views or activities.) (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 4 (reminding lawyers that [m]atters that go beyond 
strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession and 
encouraging lawyers to recommend consultation with professionals in other 
fields). Moreover, although Rule 2.1 grants specific permission for a lawyer to 
engage in moral counseling, it also qualifies that permission by suggesting 
that the lawyer should not offer unwanted advice. Id. cmt. 5 (cautioning that 
a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client and ordinar-
ily has no duty . . . to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted 
unless doing so appears to be in the clients interest). 
 97. Postema, supra note 4, at 7381. 
 98. Id. at 7580. 
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result of this moral distance is a curious kind of impersonal re-
lationship between lawyers and clients.99 
As even strong proponents of client autonomy recognize, 
morally detached legal representation can potentially distort a 
clients autonomous pursuit of his or her goals. A morally de-
tached lawyer would typically approach a client as a bundle of 
legal interests, determining how the law could be used to 
maximize the legal rights and interests of someone in the cli-
ents situation.100 As Warren Lehman puts it, such legal coun-
seling is, in essence, directed at a hypothetical client, based on 
what most clients would wantsuch as wealth maximization, 
freedom from restraint, or avoidance of regulationand may 
fail to respond to the needs or values of the actual client.101 
More perversely, as Pepper has pointed out, a lawyer providing 
advice based on a clients abstracted legal interests may implic-
itly pressure the client to make decisions that diverge from the 
clients actual values.102 Because the success of the moral de-
tachment strategy depends on an accurate match between a 
lawyers assessment of what most people would want and a cli-
ents actual values, the distorting effects of moral detachment 
are heightened in cases in which there is a fundamental diver-
gence in the moral perspectives of a lawyer and a client. 
In answer to the perverse effect of detached lawyering, cli-
ent-centered lawyering theorists have suggested a different 
strategy.103 They exhort the lawyer to employ strategies of non-
judgmental empathy to fully understand the clients situation 
and to help the client make decisions that are consistent with 
 
 99. Id. at 81. 
 100. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 4, at 3942; see also Warren Lehman, The 
Pursuit of a Clients Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979) (criticizing the per-
sonal/professional divide in client counseling). 
 101. Lehman, supra note 100, at 108788; see also Pepper, supra note 1, at 
18889. 
 102. See Pepper, supra note 1, at 18890. Lehman also points out the per-
versity of morally detached lawyering in an example of a woman of his ac-
quaintance who was newly recovering from alcoholism and who felt strongly 
that staying in her house would pose a threat to her sobriety. Rather than 
consulting a lawyer, she went ahead and sold the house, fearing that a lawyer 
would talk her into delaying the sale until she could avoid the capital gains 
tax. Lehman, supra note 100, at 1089. 
 103. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLI-
ENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991) (emphasizing the importance of understand-
ing the clients legal circumstances as well as his or her nonlegal goals and 
needs). 
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the clients actual values.104 Empathy, depending on how one 
defines it, involves actually experiencing the feelings of an-
other, or at least understanding the situation of another from 
the others perspective.105 Client-centered representation bor-
rows the concept of empathy from Carl Rogerss nondirective 
psychotherapeutic technique. Rogers defined empathy as un-
derstanding the experiences, behaviors, and feelings of others 
as they experience them, and as entering into the experience 
of clients in order to develop a feeling for their inner world and 
how they view both this inner world and the world of people 
and [events] around them.106 Because empathy builds on the 
bonds of common humanity, it is a powerful tool for bridging 
many kinds of social, economic, and cultural differences. 
However, there are significant obstacles to employing em-
pathy in the face of fundamental moral disagreement. Although 
we can experience empathy for people similar to ourselves in 
what Lynne Henderson has called an automatic or unreflec-
tive manner, using empathy to enter the internal worlds of 
others who are different involves a more conscious choice.107 We 
may encounter strong internal resistance to making the choice 
when deep moral divisions are at stake, fearing that opening 
ourselves to the perspectives of others is tantamount to condon-
ing their views.108 Internal resistance may also grow out of ex-
periences that have shaped our own values, causing us to af-
firmatively reject the way others prioritize values or see the 
world.109 Moreover, as Stephen Ellmann has thoughtfully sug-
 
 104. See id. at 4042, 26061, 27980. 
 105. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1574, 157887 (1987) (exploring several meanings and uses of the concept of 
empathy); see also Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, When Students 
Lose Perspective: Clinical Supervision and the Management of Empathy, 9 
CLINICAL L. REV. 135, 13941 (2002) (same). 
 106. BINDER ET AL., supra note 103, at 40 (alteration in original) (quoting 
G. EGAN, THE SKILLED HELPER 87 (3d ed. 1986)). By using active listening 
techniques to reflect back both the factual and emotional content that the cli-
ent has expressed, the lawyer can help the client elucidate his or her situation 
from his or her point of view, including the significance to the client of events 
and circumstances and his or her feelings about them. See id. at 5261. 
 107. See Henderson, supra note 105, at 158485. 
 108. See id. (discussing Bruno Bettelheims moral choice not to empathize 
with the motivations of Nazi doctors). Henderson questions the wisdom of the 
moral choice not to empathize because it is also important to attempt to empa-
thize despite moral disagreementeven with Nazisso that we can under-
stand the appeal of those objectionable views. See id. at 1585. 
 109. Taking a psychological perspective, Laurel Fletcher and Harvey 
Weinstein examine two reasons for which a lawyer may fail to identify with a 
KRUSE_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:54:58 AM 
418 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:389 
 
gested, even nonjudgmental expressions of empathy may be re-
ceived by clients as tacit messages of approval.110 When we en-
counter someone considering conduct we deem immoral, we 
may be reluctant to send such messages of approval.111 
B. REX AS A TRADITIONAL LAWYER 
Under the traditional model, Rexs deep moral disagree-
ment with Tina and Donnas objectives would not pose an ob-
stacle to legal representation. Although Rex would have the 
freedom to decline to represent them, he would also be free to 
take their case. He could accept representation simply because 
he was bored with the run-of-the-mill divorce case, or because 
he would be able to bill them for a lot of hours, or for no par-
ticular reason at all. As previously discussed, his representa-
tion would not be deemed a personal endorsement of his clients 
objectives, and he would be shielded from public disapproval for 
his decision to take their case. 
As previously shown, the traditional model remains confi-
dent that Rex would be able to transcend his moral commit-
ments through strategies of empathy or detachment. However, 
Rex would likely encounter intense resistance to employing 
strategies of empathy to truly enter Tina and Donnas world. 
The kind of family planning that Tina and Donna wish to pur-
 
client: (1) because of the rejection by the lawyer of tendencies in him or her-
self that the lawyer perceives in the client, and (2) because of the lawyers 
values or biases. Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 105, at 143. As an example 
of the latter, Fletcher and Weinstein suggest that a lawyers own experience 
of an alcoholic mother may interfere with her ability to competently represent 
a client seeking to maintain custody of her child against a state petition charg-
ing the mother with neglect. Id. at 144; see also David B. Wilkins, Race, Eth-
ics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux 
Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 105356 (1995) (exploring the difficulty of 
separating personal views one finds abhorrent from professional and political 
advocacy). 
 110. See Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 
99293 (1992); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 
73339 (1987). 
 111. For example, even Stephen Pepper, a strong proponent of client 
autonomy, suggests that it may be appropriate in certain situations involving 
counseling a client on legally permissible but morally distasteful options for a 
lawyer to simply state, Yes the law allows that, with a tone clearly indicat-
ing that the lawyer does not approve the conduct, and is not supporting or 
suggesting it, Pepper, supra note 1, at 203, or to indicate by his or her body 
language that [t]his would be a terrible thing to do, id. at 204. These verbal 
and nonverbal expressions of disapproval are, of course, exactly the opposite of 
the nonjudgmental stance of empathic regard. 
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sue runs counter to some of Rexs deep moral beliefs about ho-
mosexuality, and it is not just a theoretical disagreement. From 
Rexs perspective, Tina and Donnas scheme will bring concrete 
harm to an innocent child and will cause less tangible, but not 
less important, damage to the fabric of the important social in-
stitution of the family. As our examination of the internal 
moral perspective demonstrated, Rexs personal involvement in 
doing wrong would likely be experienced by him as a betrayal 
of his own ideals, and perhaps his own identity.112 To the extent 
that his values arise out of community, it may be experienced 
as a betrayal of that community as well.113 Although the tradi-
tional model of lawyering proclaims that his advancement of 
their interests is not a personal endorsement, Rex could not 
morally avoid the fact that, from his point of view, his legal ad-
vocacy for Tina and Donna would make the world a worse 
place.114 
Rex would be more likely to avoid the discomfort of empa-
thy by employing strategies of moral detachment. He would 
probably resort to advising his clients based on his understand-
ing of what the law allows them to do and what is in their best 
legal interests. In other words, he would revert to the legal 
rights and interests of hypothetical persons in Tina and 
Donnas situation and assess their choices from this deperson-
alized stance. However, the distorting effects of such a strategy 
may be particularly acute in Tina and Donnas situation, where 
society does not provide clear answers and where there may be 
significant ambivalence in their own articulation of their val-
ues. 
Tina and Donnas legal decisions will have an impact on 
their relationships with each other and with other people in 
profound and uncertain ways, introducing a host of moral con-
siderations that are intertwined with the legal options they 
must explore. For example, they will have to consider the ef- 
 
 
 112. See supra notes 6170 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Wilkins, supra note 109, at 1041 (noting the moral and social sig-
nificance of ties between individual black Americans and the black commu-
nity, which create additional burdens of justification). 
 114. See, e.g., David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green 
Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955 (1995) (defending the view that law-
yers should be held responsible for the damage they contribute to collective 
harms, even if in the individual case they cause no measurably tangible 
harm); Wilkins, supra note 109, at 103132 (discussing the view that lawyers 
should be held responsible for the effects of their representation). 
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fects on their child of the biological relationships the child 
would haveor would not havewith each of them, along with 
the psychological and emotional impacts on their child of being 
biologically related to one but not to the other of them. They 
will have to decide whether they want their child to know who 
his or her biological father is, whether they want the child to 
have a relationship with that person, and if so, what the nature 
and extent of that relationship would be. They will have to 
think about the impact of societal disapproval or prejudice as it 
may affect a child raised in a lesbian-parented household and 
how the legal structure of their family may aggravate or miti-
gate that impact. 
Tina and Donna have probably already discussed these is-
sues before consulting a lawyer. But it is realistic to assume 
that they are ambivalent about some of them, such as the ques-
tion of whether to promote a relationship between their child 
and the childs biological father. On one hand, they may think 
that it would be a good thing for their child to know his or her 
father and may even feel that they owe it to their child to facili-
tate a relationship with a father figure. On the other hand, 
they may wonder if these inclinations are a betrayal of their 
commitment to raise a child in an alternative family struc-
turea selling out of their ideals.115 After understanding 
their legal situation, Tina and Donna will have to add the in-
gredient of legal risk to their decision-making process. A lawyer 
who is employing a strategy of moral detachment is likely to 
disengage from careful counseling and advise them to proceed 
in the way most likely to protect their legal interests. In this 
case, that means discouraging any relationship between their 
child and his or her father.116 The implicit pressure to default 
 
 115. See, e.g., Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers . . . 
and a Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 18
22 (1996) (noting the value-laden reasons offered in a study of lesbian parents 
for choosing known donors as well as the reasons given for choosing anony-
mous donors). 
 116. Because of the way many artificial insemination statutes are worded 
and interpreted, prospective lesbian mothers are advised that [t]he only way 
to insure that a lesbian family will not suffer the disruption of a donor suing 
for parental rights is to use an anonymous sperm donor and have the insemi-
nation done . . . through the auspices of a physician. Id. at 24 (quoting APRIL 
MARTIN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING HANDBOOK: CREATING AND RAIS-
ING OUR FAMILIES 8687 (1993)). The leading case on parental rights is Jhor-
dan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986). In this case, two women 
decided to have a child together, and one of them, Mary K., inseminated her-
self with sperm provided by Jhordan C. Id. at 532. At issue was the California 
KRUSE_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:54:58 AM 
2005] CHALLENGE OF MORAL PLURALISM 421 
 
to legal interests presented by such limited counseling may al-
low Tina and Donna to avoid confronting their own ambiva-
lence and making a choice that is fully consistent with their 
values.117 
As this example shows, both strategies intended to help a 
lawyer transcend his or her internal moral perspective and pro-
vide morally neutral legal advice and counseling to a client
moral detachment and nonjudgmental empathyare problem-
atic in the face of fundamental moral disagreement. The per-
versity of moral detachment and the obstacles to employing 
empathy across deep moral divisions combine to frustrate the 
very thing that the traditional model seeks to achieve: the cli-
ents autonomous pursuit of his or her own values within the 
law. 
III.  SOCIAL JUSTICE MODELS: LAWYERS AS MORAL 
AGENTS, JURISPRUDENTS, AND FRIENDS 
Having seen the problems facing Rex as a lawyer operating 
under the traditional model, this section turns to the social jus-
tice models of lawyering. Under the social justice models, the 
lawyers commitments to act morally and to further the ends of 
justice are viewed as intrinsic components of the lawyers pro-
fessional duties. When the lawyer refuses to extend profes-
sional services on moral grounds, social justice theorists under-
stand it as a choice to prefer professional duties owed to the 
public over professional duties owed to the client. Because they 
reject the vision of the adversary system that reconciles these 
duties by conflating social justice with partisan advocacy, social 
justice theorists endorse a more active role for the lawyers 
moral commitments in legal representation. 
 
 
artificial insemination statute, which provided that [t]he donor of semen pro-
vided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman 
other than the donors wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural fa-
ther of a child thereby conceived. Id. at 533 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 7005(b)). [Editors Note: Section 7005(b) was repealed in 1994. However, the 
language quoted by the court appears nearly identically in CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 7613(b) (West 2004).] The court of appeals construed this section strictly to 
require the involvement of a physician to effect the statutory termination of 
the sperm donors potential paternal claims. Id. at 535. 
 117. See Bernstein, supra note 115, at 22 ([I]t seems likely that some les-
bian mothers would prefer to parent with known donors, but are scared to do 
so in light of the threats posed by known donors to the planned lesbian fam-
ily.). 
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Applying each of the three social justice models discussed 
in this section to the lesbian family planning hypothetical, the 
likely result is that Rex would decline to represent Tina and 
Donna or would eventually terminate representation. Given the 
difficulties that the lawyers internal moral perspective poses 
for lawyering across a fundamental moral divide, the social jus-
tice models seem to get that answer right. Tina and Donna 
would probably be better off without Rex as their lawyer. How-
ever, the efficacy of each of these social justice models is un-
dermined by the fact that none of the models explain why Tina 
and Donna are morally or legally deserving of any representa-
tion at all. If diversity in moral perspectives is the natural out-
come of reason in a free society, social justice in a morally plu-
ralistic society would seem to demand legal representation of 
all clients with reasonable, though diverse, moral perspectives. 
A. MORAL ACTIVIST LAWYERING 
The moral activist model of lawyering arises from a cri-
tique within moral philosophy of the lawyers professional role-
differentiated behavior. The central inquiry of moral activists is 
sometimes framed with the question, Can a good lawyer be a 
good person?118 This question implies both that the lawyers 
partisan role may demand behavior that violates the directives 
of ordinary morality and that the lawyers role within the ad-
versary system of justice illegitimately excuses those actions.119 
The answer that moral activists give is that the lawyer should 
be held morally accountable for his or her professional behav-
ior, even when that behavior is dictated by his or her profes-
sional role. 
1. Moral Activism Explained 
David Luban is generally credited with pioneering the 
most comprehensive philosophical critique of the lawyers 
amoral partisan role and articulating a morally engaged alter-
 
 118. Fried, supra note 84, at 1060. This question has resonated for moral 
theorists interested in redefining the lawyers role along moral activist lines. 
See, e.g., Pepper, Lawyers Amoral Role, supra note 3, at 614 (characterizing 
the question as symbolizing ten years of heated academic discourse on the 
subject of moral justification for the lawyers amoral role). 
 119. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 84, at 106162 (describing these concerns); 
see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 67895 (considering the lawyers moral ob-
ligations when functioning as a nonadvocate); Symposium on the Lawyers 
Amoral Ethical Role, supra note 10; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Profes-
sionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 215 (1975). 
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native vision, which he calls moral activism.120 Lubans pri-
mary concern is to close the gap he apprehends between legally 
justified and morally justified behavior.121 The problem with 
the professional duty of zealous advocacy, in Lubans view, is 
that zeal means pushing claims to the limit of the law and 
then a bit further, into the realm of what is colorably the limit 
of the law, a marginal territory that inevitably lie[s] beyond 
moral limits.122 
Lubans moral activism would subjugate the lawyers pro-
fessional obligations to his or her moral obligations, requiring 
the lawyer to determine the moral justification for the adver-
sary system in the context in which he or she practices and to 
weigh the strength of that moral justification against the moral 
offense resulting from actions he or she takes.123 After critiqu-
ing an impressive range of arguments in favor of adversary jus-
tice,124 Luban concludes that the adversary system is only 
weakly justified on the pragmatic ground that it seems to do 
as good a job as any at finding truth and protecting legal 
rights.125 Accordingly, the practices of strong partisan advo-
cacy would be outweighed by concerns of ordinary morality in 
most civil cases.126 Specifically, the moral activist lawyer would 
not be morally justified in pursu[ing] . . . substantively unjust 
ends on behalf of his or her client, manipulat[ing] . . . morally 
 
 120. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 6, at 248 (acknowledging that David 
Luban has done more than anyone else to bring depth to the field and that 
Luban has pioneered the critique of the traditional view of the lawyers pro-
fessional duty of zealous advocacy); Paul Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 
8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 9, 14 (1995) (It was David Luban . . . who established 
the issue of role morality in the central position it possesses in legal ethics to-
day.). 
 121. Lubans stated aim in promoting moral activist lawyering is to make 
the law more just and the lawyers clients more public spirited. LUBAN, supra 
note 6, at xvii. He notes that citizens encounter the law through lawyers, and 
[s]ince the law as it touches us cannot be different from what lawyers do, it 
will not be better than lawyers care to make it. Id. 
 122. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: 
LAWYERS ROLES AND LAWYERS ETHICS 83, 89 (David Luban ed., 1983). 
 123. See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 12933, 14849. 
 124. Id. at 6792. 
 125. Id. at 92. 
 126. See id. at 149 (arguing that because it has only a weak pragmatic jus-
tification, the adversary system doesnt excuse more than the most minor de-
viations from common morality and that [i]n the civil suit paradigm, there is 
no adversary system excuse to speak of); see also id. at 13337 (discussing 
generally the weight to be assigned to justifications in determining the valid-
ity of an institutional excuse). 
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defensible law to achieve outcomes that . . . violate its spirit, 
distorting the truth, or employing means that inflict morally 
unjustifiable damage on other people.127 
Even so, Luban maintains that in some types of casesin 
what he calls the criminal defense paradigmthe goals of the 
adversary system go beyond resolving disputes through accu-
rate fact-finding; in such cases, the additional goal of overpro-
tecting individuals from the state more strongly justifies the 
lawyers traditional adversarial role.128 Interestingly, Lubans 
criminal defense paradigm extends well beyond actual criminal 
cases to include any civil case in which relatively weak individ-
ual clients face off against economically entrenched institu-
tional actors in the private sphere.129 Though the results are 
different in the criminal defense paradigm, the analysis re-
mains the same. The lawyers actions must be justified not 
merely by appealing to the lawyers advocacy role, but also by 
analyzing the links in the chain that connect the lawyers ac-
tions to the moral justification for the adversary system itself 
and by weighing the strength of that justification against the 
ordinary moral wrongs that the lawyers actions will cause.130 
Luban differs from the traditionalists in his assessment of 
the justice issues involved in denying legal representation to 
clients based on moral concerns. As previously discussed, the 
traditionalists view the lawyers decision to refuse representa-
tion on moral grounds as a self-indulgent choice that under-
mines the justice of providing access to the law to any client 
with arguably legal claims.131 In contrast, Luban endorses the 
exercise of what he calls the lawyers Lysistratian preroga-
tive . . . to withhold services from those of whose projects [the 
lawyer] disapproves.132 According to Luban, it is simply not a 
moral wrong to deny legal services in the aid of immoral ends 
because respecting autonomy is only a prima facie good that 
 
 127. Id. at 157. 
 128. See id. at 63. 
 129. See id. at 6365. For example, Luban would hold that zealous partisan 
advocacy is morally justified for one-shot individuals litigating against 
wealthy repeat players, such as those described in Marc Galanter, Why the 
Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW 
& SOCY REV. 95 (1974). LUBAN, supra note 6, at 6465. 
 130. See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 12847 (describing in detail the calculus 
that justifies actions within role morality). 
 131. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 132. LUBAN, supra note 6, at 169. See id. at 16669 for a discussion of the 
rationale underlying this option. 
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must be weighed against the moral goodness (or badness) of the 
choices that people make by exercising their autonomy.133 
Rather than viewing the denial of representation on moral 
grounds as a threat to justice, Luban views the lawyers deci-
sion not to participate in the nefarious schemes of an unscru-
pulous client as part of a dense network of informal social 
pressure134 that helps society survive by supplementing the 
laws proscription of antisocial behavior.135 
2. Rex as a Moral Activist Lawyer 
If Rex were a moral activist lawyer, he would hold himself 
morally accountable to avoid social injustice from occurring 
through the actions he took in his professional role. Based on 
his moral commitments, Rex would probably refuse to take 
Tina and Donnas lesbian family planning case.136 Rex would 
likely view Tina and Donnas wish to raise a child within a les-
bian household as causing needless harm to an innocent third 
party. Moreover, from within his own moral perspective, Rex 
would not conceptualize Tina and Donna as falling within 
Lubans criminal defense paradigm. A more lesbian-friendly 
lawyer might see them as individuals struggling against deep 
and powerful forces of entrenched homophobia and thus as fal-
ling within the paradigm.137 However, Rex would see their de-
sire to raise a child as threatening the important social institu-
tion of the traditional family and as potentially damaging the 
 
 133. See Luban, supra note 7, at 63743. 
 134. LUBAN, supra note 6, at 168. 
 135. See id. at 16869. 
 136. A moral activist lawyer could, on the other hand, agree to represent 
Tina and Donna with the objective of influenc[ing them] for the better, id. at 
160, or attempting to transform and redeem [them], id. at 163. Luban envi-
sions the lawyer engaging his or her client in moral dialogue about the right-
ness or wrongness of [the clients projects]. Id. at 173. To achieve the ends of 
social justice in such counseling, Luban would permit the lawyer to use coer-
cive tactics, such as threats of withdrawal or even a betrayal by the lawyer of 
a clients projects in the event that the lawyer remains convinced (after due 
dialogue) that what the client wants to do is immoral. Id. at 174. 
 137. Compare Lubans treatment of the moral dilemma faced by a criminal 
defense attorney in deciding whether to cross-examine a truthful rape victim. 
Id. at 15052. Luban writes that although [t]he defendant is confronted by 
the state, . . . the victim is confronted by the millennia-long cultural tradition 
of patriarchy, and any powerful social institution is a threat, including dif-
fuse yet tangible institutions such as patriarchy. Id. at 151. While Luban ul-
timately concludes that the proposed cross-examination should not be allowed 
to proceed, he admits that [t]he question is a very close call and that he has 
arrived at his answer without much confidence. Id. at 152. 
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very fabric of society.138 By withholding legal services, Rex 
would see himself applying informal social pressure through 
noncooperation in a nefarious scheme.139 Simply put, as a 
moral activist, Rex would justify his refusal of representation 
on the ground that if all lawyers refused to assist the Tinas and 
Donnas who came to their offices, the world would be a better 
place. 
The problem with moral activist Rexs decision to decline to 
represent Tina and Donna is not its result but its justification. 
Lubans argument depends on an appeal to shared norms, 
which is problematic in a society characterized by reasonable 
moral pluralism.140 It cannot be argued that within a morally 
pluralistic society the lawyer serves a legitimate role in the 
administration of justice by filtering out the legal claims of per-
sons with whom he or she happens to fundamentally disagree. 
Therefore, although Rex reaches the right result under the 
moral activist model, the justification supporting Rexs decision 
to decline representation is inconsistent with the recognition of 
moral pluralism. 
B. CONTEXTUAL LAWYERING: THE LAWYER AS JURISPRUDENT 
The contextual lawyering model builds on the critiques of 
the adversary system made by the moral activists, but its in-
corporation of justice considerations into professional decision 
making arises from jurisprudential rather than moral the-
ory.141 The primary question in the contextual lawyering model 
centers on the meaning of the law. From the jurisprudential 
perspective of contextual lawyering, unjust legal claims are not  
 
 
 138. From Rexs perspective, Tina and Donnas desire to parent a child to-
gether could be categorized as what Luban calls a collectively harmful ac-
tion. Luban, supra note 114, at 960. In other words, through their creation of 
a lesbian-parented family, Tina and Donna would be acting in a way that, if 
aggregated, would make the world a qualitatively different place by changing 
societal norms concerning family structure. See id. at 96061. 
 139. LUBAN, supra note 6, at 168. 
 140. For a fuller explication of this point, see Atkinson, supra note 14, at 
86771, 90647. 
 141. See, e.g., David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 873, 87476 (1999). Luban notes that his and William Simons con-
clusions and arguments on many subjects are the same and that some read-
ers might regard [them] (as [he does]) as kindred spirits because of [their] 
shared criticisms of adversarial ethics and [their] advocacy of what Simon 
calls ethically ambitious or high-commitment lawyering. Id. at 874 (quoting 
SIMON, supra note 6, at 205). 
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judged by standards of morality, but by standards of legal 
merit.142 This theoretical movement away from considerations 
of personal morality to considerations of legal merit would 
seem to circumvent the major difficulty posed in a morally plu-
ralistic society: lawyers using representation decisions to im-
pose their morality on those with whom they morally dis-
agree.143 Because contextual lawyers base their representation 
decisions on values immanent in the law, their appeal is osten-
sibly to societys norms rather than to their own.144 However, as 
this section demonstrates, the theoretical appeal of this ap-
proach breaks down in its application to an area of law fraught 
with deep moral divisions and to a lawyer-client relationship 
itself characterized by the same deep moral divisions that are 
reflected in the law. 
1. Contextual Lawyering Explained 
William Simon is the primary proponent of contextual 
lawyering, a sophisticated vision of the lawyer as jurisprudent 
that he has developed over the course of two decades.145 Simon 
shares Lubans concern that traditional ethical standards lead 
to injustice in the circumstances at hand in service of a vision 
of greater justice . . . elsewhere and later that the adversary 
system is ultimately unable to deliver.146 However, Simon envi-
sions the lawyer not as a private moral agent attempting to ac-
commodate his or her professional-role behavior to the dictates 
of ordinary morality, but rather as an institutional actor 
charged with respecting and enforcing public values inherent in 
the law.147 Rather than viewing the ethical dilemmas of lawyer-
 
 142. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 6, at 911, 13869 (describing a contex-
tual approach to legal ethics); Luban, supra note 141, at 87985. 
 143. See supra Part I.B. 
 144. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 10, at 37274. 
 145. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 6; William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in 
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988); William H. Simon, Ethics, Profes-
sionalism, and Meaningful Work, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 445 (1997); William H. 
Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217 (1996). 
Another prominent proponent of contextual lawyering is Deborah Rhode. See, 
e.g., RHODE, supra note 94, at 6667; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Counseling, 
Symposium, Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 
602, 603 (2003) (characterizing her approach as contextual). 
 146. See SIMON, supra note 6, at 2. Simon critiques the argument that a 
client has a right to the zealous advocacy of a lawyer in the pursuit of immoral 
ends, id. at 2652, and the argument that such advocacy ultimately produces 
justice, id. at 5376. 
 147. See id. at 1518. 
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ing as conflicts between the lawyers personal morality and the 
requirements of law, Simon perceives them as problems of con-
textual interpretation of what the law requires.148 Simon is 
careful to distinguish his broader, more substantive vision of 
law from principles of morality that are socially grounded out-
side the legal system.149 For him, judgments about justice or 
legal merit are distinctly legal in nature, grounded in the 
methods and sources of authority of the professional culture.150 
Simons vision of justiceor, as he also calls it, legal 
merit151depends on his rejection of a narrow positivist vision 
of law. He defines positivism as the notion that legal norms 
are strongly differentiated from nonlegal ones by having been 
legislatively enacted or judicially created or otherwise made 
law by some authority having jurisdiction to declare law152 and 
by virtue of being commands or prohibitions backed by sanc-
tions.153 Following Ronald Dworkin, Simon argues that this 
narrow view of law is untenable and that law must be con-
strued more broadly to include background values or principles 
that are part of the law in the sense that they affect the deci-
sions of cases154 by virtue of being invoked in interpreting the 
scope and meaning of legal pronouncements.155 These back-
ground principles and values have substantive moral content 
and make an important connection between law and justice: 
they both justify enacted law and provide grounds upon which 
to criticize enacted law.156 
 
 
 148. See id. at 7995; see also Luban, supra note 141, at 88284. 
 149. SIMON, supra note 6, at 17. 
 150. Id. at 138. Simons vision of the legal interpretation required of con-
textual lawyers has been described as very Dworkinian in nature. Luban, 
supra note 141, at 886; see also Wendel, supra note 10, at 373 (describing the 
influence of Ronald Dworkins jurisprudence on Simons view). 
 151. Simon points out that each phrase, justice and legal merit, cap-
tures part of what law includes: The latter has the advantage of reminding us 
that we are concerned with the materials of conventional legal analysis; the 
former has the advantage of reminding us that these materials include many 
vaguely specified aspirational norms. SIMON, supra note 6, at 138. 
 152. Id. at 37; see also id. at 79. 
 153. Id. at 37. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. at 3739. For a fuller explication of Dworkins concept of prin-
ciples as part of the law, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
1445 (1978). 
 156. See SIMON, supra note 6, at 7985 (generally contrasting positivist 
and substantivist visions of law). 
KRUSE_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:54:58 AM 
2005] CHALLENGE OF MORAL PLURALISM 429 
 
In determining the bounds of the law that constrain the 
lawyers advocacy, Simon would have the lawyer reject cate-
gorical ethical rules and instead employ a case-by-case analy-
sis, utilizing what he calls the basic maxim of his contextual 
view of legal ethics: Lawyers should take those actions that, 
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, 
seem likely to promote justice.157 Simon notes that other insti-
tutional actors, such as judges or juries, are generally able to 
make more reliable determinations of the [substantive legal] 
merits than are individual lawyers.158 However, the lawyer 
must be aware that there may be important occasions in 
which these other institutional actors may be poorly positioned 
to make reliable decisions because they lack relevant informa-
tion or because they are corrupt or incompetent.159 Somewhat 
controversially, Simons contextual view would counsel the 
lawyer to disregard interpretations of the laweven controlling 
legal interpretationsthat are incompatible with the underly-
ing principles of the law.160 
Simons contextual lawyer would look similar to Lubans 
moral activist lawyer in professional decisions, though the ba-
sis on which the decisions would be justified differs in a signifi-
cant respect. The contextual lawyer, like the moral activist 
lawyer, would feel justified in refusing to represent a client 
seeking ends that undermined rather than advanced the inter-
ests of justice.161 However, the contextualist would have a legal 
 
 157. Id. at 138; see also id. at 13839 (describing the notion of contextual 
judgment). Simon argues that this contextual view of legal ethics requires 
the lawyer to determine what justice requires by resolving tensions along 
three axes: Substance versus Procedure, Purpose versus Form, and Broad 
versus Narrow Framing of the requirements of law. See id. at 139. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 140. According to Simon, the lawyer should use a case-by-case 
analysis to decide how closely to hew to the institutional role of advancing the 
clients interests, guided by the following maxim: [T]he more reliable the 
relevant procedures and institutions, the less direct responsibility the lawyer 
need assume for the substantive justice of the resolution. Id. 
 160. See id. at 14546. This view has been criticized as showing insufficient 
deference to and respect for the importance of positive law as societys best ef-
fort to resolve moral differences. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 10, at 401 (criti-
cizing Simons approach as too discretionary). In arguing in favor of an au-
thority conception, Wendel notes that good faith disagreement would be 
resolved by the lawyers deference to governing legal norms. Id. at 375. 
 161. As Simon explains, the specter of lawyers engaging in anything more 
than minimal scrutiny of the merits of client goals and claims frequently 
raises a concern about representation being denied to unpopular clients. 
SIMON, supra note 6, at 160. However, he argues that the concern for unpopu-
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argument to justify his or her refusal to represent the client: 
the clients case has no legal merit.162 
2. Rex as a Contextual Lawyer 
If Rex were a contextual lawyer of the sort envisioned by 
Simon, his primary commitment would not be fidelity to his 
own moral principles, but fidelity to the moral principles inher-
ent in the law, as they are expressed in both substantive and 
procedural standards. However, when faced with the legal is-
sues inherent in lesbian family planningwhere the divisions 
of moral pluralism are reflected in the lawRexs understand-
ing and interpretation of the fundamental principles of law 
would inevitably be shaped by his moral views. Thus, the legal 
analysis of background principles in the law, which Simon en-
visions as an escape from the vagaries of personal moral judg-
ment, would not provide Rex with a neutral standpoint from 
which to mediate his fundamental moral disagreement with 
Tina and Donnas objectives. 
For example, one important legal question that will come 
into play in advising Tina and Donna is whether pursuing co-
parent or second-parent adoption is a legally available op-
tion.163 If we assume, for example, that the statute in Tina and 
Donnas state resembles that in many states, it probably explic-
itly permits adoptions by single persons and by married cou-
ples, but it says nothing about adoptions by same-sex cou-
ples.164 As with many adoption statutes, there may be case law 
or statutory authority directing courts to construe the provi-
sions of the adoption statute in light of the overarching purpose 
of promoting the best interests of the child.165 One strategic op-
tion would therefore be to attempt to convince a judge that the 
 
lar clients ought to be based on what the source of the unpopularity is. Id. at 
162. According to Simon, If the unpopularity reflects a valid assessment of 
the legal merits of the clients claims and goals, there should be no concern at 
all. Id. 
 162. Indeed, Simon deliberately uses the terms justice and legal merit 
interchangeably to illustrate that his vision of justice is based on norms inher-
ent in the law. See id. at 138. 
 163. In co-parent adoption, a gay couple seeks to adopt an unrelated child 
together, much as a married couple would adopt a child that was not born to 
either spouse. Appell, Lesbian and Gay Adoption I, supra note 80, at 77. In a 
second-parent adoption, the child is typically born to one partner in a lesbian 
couple, and the other partner seeks to adopt the child much as a stepparent 
would. Id. 
 164. Id. at 79. 
 165. Id. at 80. 
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co-parent adoption would be in the childs best interests and 
that the statute should thus be construed to permit it.166 
A lesbian-friendly lawyer who viewed Tina and Donna as a 
legitimate family yet to be recognized by the law would not 
have a problem making this argument under Simons contex-
tual model. Such a lawyer would view the narrow framing of 
laws around the two-parent heterosexual family as short-
sighted. The lawyer would view Tina and Donnas efforts to 
structure their actions to preserve the stability of each of their 
relationships with the child as a fulfillment, rather than a cor-
ruption, of the fundamental purposes167 of the law: protecting 
the important liberty and privacy interests inherent in parent-
hood168 and promoting the best interests of children.169 
Rex, however, does not believe that it is in a childs best in-
terests to be adopted by Tina and Donna, and he probably 
views the language of the adoption statute as safeguarding im-
 
 166. This type of approach has succeeded in some cases. See, e.g., In re 
Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 53638 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1995) (finding that it was in the best interests of the children to be 
adopted by their mothers lesbian partner); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 
(N.Y. 1995) (noting that a construction of the adoption statute at issue that 
would deny parental rights based solely on [a] biological mothers sexual ori-
entation or marital status . . . would not only be unjust under the circum-
stances, but also might raise constitutional concerns in light of the adoption 
statutes historically consistent purposethe best interests of the child). 
However, this approach has also been rejected in some cases. See, e.g., In re 
Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 68283 (Wis. 1994) (refusing to apply a best 
interests of the child analysis to interpret an adoption statute so as to allow a 
woman to adopt her lesbian partners child). 
 167. Simon defines a fundamental purpose as vindicat[ing] a basic 
value, SIMON, supra note 6, at 146, and asserts that the clearer and more 
fundamental the relevant purposes, the more the lawyer should consider her-
self bound by them, id. at 14546. 
 168. For explication of some of these arguments, see, for example, Appell, 
supra note 75, at 68889, 73237 (defining the parental rights doctrine as 
the fuller doctrine that defines parents and limits intervention into the fam-
ily and concluding that lesbian and gay parenting does not fundamentally 
challenge the doctrine); and Mark Strasser, Fit to Be Tied: On Custody, Discre-
tion, and Sexual Orientation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 841 (1997) (criticizing custody 
decisions in gay- and lesbian-parent cases as inconsistent with fundamental 
constitutional principles of parental rights). 
 169. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: 
Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 
253 (criticizing the legal, policy, and social science analyses at the heart of ar-
guments that gay and lesbian custody and visitation presumptively contro-
verts the best interests of children); see also Polikoff, supra note 77, at 491
527 (discussing the adaptation of older legal doctrines in order to address the 
best interests of children in light of many new forms of family). 
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portant principles protecting the two-parent heterosexual fam-
ily and as a fundamental expression of societys deeply held 
faith in the sanctity of marriage.170 He would see the narrow 
construction of the adoption statute as properly protecting chil-
dren from exactly the type of legal manipulation of the family 
paradigm that Tina and Donna are trying to undertake. The 
idea that a court might interpret statutes broadly, using the 
best interests of the child standard to legitimate a lesbian-
parented family would be seen as an incompetent or corrupt 
use of judicial power. Attempts to structure Tina and Donnas 
relationship in ways that promote that kind of judicial decision 
making would be viewed by Rex as running contrary to the 
fundamental background principles supporting the heterosex-
ual family that are inherent in the law.171 
Contextual lawyering theorists might object at this point 
that Rex would be wrong about the background principles of 
the law and that this hypothetical simply demonstrates that 
bad lawyers make bad law. But it is difficult to argue that prin-
ciples of logical consistency or narrative coherence of the law 
would determine one correct answer to the question of whether 
adoption statutes should be construed to permit lesbian co-
parenting. One could call the legal, constitutional, and moral 
analysis that underlies Rexs position wrong, but only from 
 
 170. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (refusing to find 
that a state statute presuming the paternity of the husband when a child is 
born into a marriage violates the due process rights of the supposed biological 
father and observing that our traditions have protected the marital family 
against [such claims]); cf. Polikoff, supra note 77, at 468 (identifying the the-
ory that every child should have one mother and one father, neither more nor 
less, as a central component of the traditional legal definition of parenthood). 
 171. The scholarship of Lynn Wardle provides a paradigm for the type of 
analysis in which Rex would likely engage. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Prefer-
ence for Marital Couple AdoptionConstitutional and Policy Reflections, 5 J.L. 
& FAM. STUD. 345 (2003) (analyzing the fairness, desirability, and constitu-
tionality of laws and policies that favor married over unmarried couples where 
adoption is concerned and concluding that such a preference for marriage is 
most consistent with the public interest); Lynn D. Wardle, Relationships Be-
tween Family and Government, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (2000) (challenging the 
idea that the structure and stability of families has no significant impact on 
the social and political welfare of society); Lynn D. Wardle, The Bonds of Mat-
rimony and the Bonds of Constitutional Democracy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349 
(2003) (examining the historical and contemporary importance of the marital 
family unit in the development of government and suggesting that according 
the same treatment to alternative relationships may detrimentally affect the 
Constitution); Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting 
on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (arguing that gay and lesbian parenting 
may have adverse effects on children being raised in such homes). 
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within a moral framework that does not see homosexuality as 
immoral. From within a normative framework that views ho-
mosexuality as deviant, Rexs analysis would remain sound.172 
Because his moral commitments would lead him to an in-
terpretation of the law that would delegitimate Tina and 
Donnas legal objectives, it is likely that Rex the contextual 
lawyer, just like Rex the moral activist lawyer, would simply 
fail to form a lawyer-client relationship with Tina and Donna. 
However, as a contextual lawyer his denial of representation 
would look quite different. Rather than telling Tina and Donna 
that he could not represent them because what they wanted to 
do was immoral, he would tell them that it was not legally pos-
sible. In one sense they would get more from Rexs counsel than 
they would from the moral activist lawyer, who would have 
given them a lecture on morality and shown them the door. But 
in another sense they would get less because the legal author-
ity with which the contextual lawyer would speak would leave 
them with little motivation to seek a second opinion from a 
lawyer more sympathetic to their situation. 
C. THE FRIENDSHIP MODEL OF LAWYERING: THE LAWYER AS 
MORAL COLLABORATOR 
A third model of lawyering vests the issue of justice in the 
quality and integrity of the lawyer-client relationship itself, 
drawing on conceptions of justice as care, client goodness, and 
friendship. Because this friendship model defines justice in 
terms of the process that occurs within the lawyer-client rela-
tionship rather than in terms of the outcome of that process, it 
holds out hope for bridging the divisions inherent in moral plu-
 
 172. See, e.g., Ball & Pea, supra note 169, at 25657 (acknowledging that 
Wardles views concerning the harmfulness of homosexual parenting are 
shared by many judges, legislators, and members of the public and that while 
his article attempts to present a coherent position criticizing the view that 
gays and lesbians should have the same parental rights as heterosexuals, his 
conclusions are flawed, both normatively and empirically). The notion that 
society is deeply divided over the issue of homosexuality, and that the law does 
not resolve that division, is, in essence, the force of Justice Scalias dissent in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that in invalidating Texass sodomy law on constitutional grounds, the Court 
had taken sides in the culture war). It should be noted that Scalias criticism 
was not to say that moral considerations had no place in the law, but rather 
that the courts are the inappropriate institutions in which to resolve them. See 
id. at 603 (Social perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time, 
and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of 
such matters is the best.). 
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ralism. The question for the friendship model of lawyering is 
whether this hope can be fulfilled in the face of fundamental 
moral disagreement. 
1. Lawyering as Friendship Defined 
Thomas Shaffer and Robert Cochran have developed the 
most sophisticated version of the lawyer as friend model of 
lawyering.173 Shaffer and Cochran describe the lawyer-client 
relationship as a relationship in which the lawyer sees the cli-
ent as a collaborator in the good.174 They invoke an Aristote-
lian conception of friendship to explain that true friends do not 
merely take pleasure in one anothers company or prove useful 
to one another.175 Rather, friends are mutually concerned that 
 
 173. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6 (setting forth the lawyer as 
friend model and providing a framework for its use in client counseling). 
Shaffer and Cochran distinguish the lawyer as friend model from other possi-
ble models: the lawyer as godfather, in which the lawyer decides alone what 
the clients best interests are and pursues those interests without regard to 
the clients reservations, see id. at 514; the lawyer as hired gun, which en-
compasses traditional models based on maximizing client autonomy, id. at 15
29; and the lawyer as guru, which encompasses both moral activism and con-
textual lawyering, id. at 3039. Cochran also collaborated with John DiPippa 
and Martha Peters on a lawyering-skills textbook that elaborates on the law-
yer as friend model. See ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-
LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSEL-
ING (1999) (referring to this approach as the collaborative decision-making 
model); see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-
at-Law: Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 327, 37896 (1998) (dis-
cussing the lawyer as friend model in the context of counseling criminal de-
fendants regarding confessions). 
 174. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 47. This use of the friendship 
metaphor and the reliance on Aristotelian theories of friendship has received 
the most attention by critics and commentators on Shaffer and Cochrans 
work. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, Whats Love Got to Do with It?Its Not 
Like Theyre Your Friends for Christs Sake: The Complicated Relationship 
Between Lawyer and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211 (2003) (criticizing the friend-
ship model of lawyering as involving pretense and adverse effects on lawyers 
and instead advocating a fiduciary/agent model); Jack L. Sammons, Rank 
Strangers to Me: Shaffer and Cochrans Friendship Model of Moral Counseling 
in the Law Office, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1995) (criticizing Shaffer 
and Cochrans friendship model and proposing the rank stranger model as a 
better approach). Shaffer and Cochran have defended their approach in the 
face of such criticism. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., 
Lawyers as Strangers and Friends: A Reply to Professor Sammons, 18 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 69 (1995) (responding to Jack Sammonss criticisms as set 
forth in Sammons, supra). 
 175. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 4547. Aristotle indeed catego-
rized friendship into three types: friendship based on utility, friendship based 
on pleasure, and friendship based on goodness. ARISTOTLE, THE NICO-
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both of them be and become good persons.176 Shaffer and 
Cochran envision a lawyer-client relationship in which the law-
yer and the client help each other become better people through 
caring, truthfulness, and moral conversation.177 
The central feature of the lawyer as friend model is moral 
conversation, which Shaffer and Cochran view as an unavoid-
able component of legal representation.178 In their view, moral 
dialogue pervades law-office conversations because [l]egal 
claims rest on normative considerations and because almost 
all decisions made in the law office will benefit some people at 
the expense of others and will thus have moral implications.179 
Part of the job of a lawyer in moral conversation with a client is 
to help enable[] the client to care for others by showing care 
toward the client, confronting the client with moral insight 
into things that the client cannot see about himself or herself, 
and collaborating with the client in the difficult task of 
[d]etermining what the good requires in a particular circum-
stance.180 
As in the moral activist model, the lawyer working within 
the friendship model would ultimately be held morally ac-
countable for his or her actions, but Shaffer and Cochran take 
issue with the moral elitism implicit in this model. They point 
out that the moral activist, concerned primarily with just out-
 
MACHEAN ETHICS bk. VIII, ch. 3 (David Ross, trans., rev. by J.L. Ackrill & J.O. 
Urmson, Oxford Univ. Press 1980). According to Aristotles virtue ethics, 
friendship based on goodness is the perfect friendship because friendship 
based on utility or pleasure is incidental and thus less enduring than friend-
ship based on goodness. Id. at 19596. It is unclear why enduring friendship 
should be the benchmark for a professional relationship that is by nature con-
tingent on the professional providing useful services to the client. See 
Sammons, supra note 174, at 1415. However, the notion of Aristotelian 
friendship is probably best understood as a metaphor for the kind of mutuality 
and respect that Shaffer and Cochran believe should characterize a lawyer-
client relationship. 
 176. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 48. 
 177. Id. at 4748. 
 178. Id. at 1. 
 179. Id. Morality, they explain, is much less about stark choices between 
things that are morally right and morally wrong and much more perva-
sively about choices between something that is better and something that is 
worse. See id. at 23. 
 180. Id. at 47. At other places, Shaffer and Cochran write that their friend-
ship model offers the opportunity for the lawyer and the client to engage in 
moral reasoning together, id. at 113, to participate in a shared moral life 
during legal representation, id. at 126, and to humbly seek after the good, 
recognizing that collaboration is difficult, id. at 48. 
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comes, is not averse to manipulating, controlling, or overriding 
client decisions to produce the right result,181 in the tradition of 
gentleman lawyers who take it as [t]heir responsibility for 
their clients and for society . . . to see that their clients do the 
right thing.182 Shaffer and Cochran view manipulation or pre-
emption of client moral decision making as inconsistent with 
the primary commitment to client goodness,183 as deeper moral 
growth comes when we act morally in freedom, from internal 
rather than external direction.184 
Shaffer and Cochran reject the moral activist and contex-
tualist focus on just results and instead define morality in 
terms of goodness185 and ethics in terms of caring,186 drawing 
on a range of classical, theological, and feminist sources.187 
Shaffer has suggested that the lawyer might view his or her le-
gal practice as a professional life of ministry to clients.188 In 
this ministry, the lawyer needs to care not just about the effects 
of his or her actions on the clients behalf, but also about the 
type of person the client is becoming during the representa-
 
 181. See id. at 3235. 
 182. Id. at 3233. Shaffer and Cochran characterize the moral activist ap-
proach to client counseling, particularly as it is advanced by William Simon, 
as the lawyer as guru. Id. at 32. 
 183. See id. at 3839; see also Cochran, supra note 173, at 38081. 
 184. Cochran, supra note 173, at 380. 
 185. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 4248. 
 186. See id. at 7172. 
 187. The lawyer as friend model is built on deeply embedded theological 
conceptions of what it means to be a good person, both for the lawyer and for 
the client. Shaffer, for example, has worked out the main tenets that underlie 
the lawyer as friend model in answer to the question, Is it possible to be a 
Christian and a lawyer? THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A 
LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT 32 (1981). Shaffer describes his vision of 
lawyering as a calling to the practice of law as a ministry. Id. at 3536; see 
also Thomas L. Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 
S. CAL. L. REV. 721 (1975) (discussing Christian values in relation to the Code 
of Professional Responsibility); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical 
Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 98691 (1987) (discussing the importance 
of religious tradition in legal ethics); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law 
as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 231, 24753 (1979) (describing the 
role for religious principles in lawyering). Cochrans own work has proceeded 
along more secular lines of developing what he calls the collaborative ap-
proach to lawyering. See generally COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 173 (criticiz-
ing the authoritarian and client-centered counseling models of lawyering 
and discussing the merits and operation of a collaborative model). Shaffer 
and Cochran also draw on Aristotelian conceptions of friendship, SHAFFER & 
COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 4546, and the feminist ethic of care, id. at 71. 
 188. SHAFFER, supra note 187, at 10. 
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tion.189 The collaborative lawyer-client relationship thus emu-
lates theologian Martin Bubers conception of the I-Thou rela-
tionship, in which the lawyer seeks both to change something 
in the [client], [and] also to . . . be changed by him.190 
The lawyer as friend model seems to assume a personal af-
finity between lawyer and client that would be particularly 
challenging in a modern democratic society characterized by 
moral pluralism. As commentators on Shaffer and Cochran 
have pointed out, the Aristotelian conception of friendship 
arose out of an aristocratic view of friendship between men of 
equal status and virtue, which does not take account of the dif-
ferences in power and status between lawyers and their cli-
ents.191 However, Shaffer and Cochran defend their lawyer as 
friend model as workable despite the obstacles posed by differ-
ences in moral values.192 Although they recognize that such dif-
ferences may create a barrier to moral discourse in the law of-
fice, they do not perceive those differences to be insurmount-
able.193 For one thing, they argue, most people in America are 
 
 189. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 44. 
 190. Id. at 37 (quoting MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Kaufman trans., 1942) 
(1923)). 
 191. See, e.g., Condlin, supra note 174, at 25457, 29497 (discussing Aris-
totles conception of friendship as communal sharing of virtue that served as 
the prototypical social and political relationship and arguing that this type of 
friendship is impossible to achieve in the lawyer-client context); Sammons, su-
pra note 174, at 1326 (arguing that Shaffer and Cochrans account of the 
lawyer-client relationship fails because it has no community of shared values 
as an analog for the polis, or city-state, in which Aristotles ethics were situ-
ated). Shaffer and Cochran themselves concede that Martin Buber, whose con-
ception of an I-Thou relationship provides another analog for the lawyer as 
friend model, almost despaired of professional relationships as places for 
moral counseling because of the inequality inherent in the professional rela-
tionship. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 37 (discussing MARTIN 
BUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN (M. Friedman & R. Smith trans., 1965)). 
 192. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 4952. Shaffer and Cochran 
also address differences in power and status, cautioning that moral conversa-
tion carries with it the danger of domination of the client by the lawyer. Id. at 
50. However, they argue that the greater peril arises from a failure to discuss 
moral issues. Id. at 51. Moreover, as Cochran elaborates elsewhere, a lawyer 
can adjust for power differentials by regulat[ing] the intensity with which 
[the lawyer] engages the client in moral discourse, Cochran, supra note 173, 
at 391, being more hesitant to push in situations in which [certain] deter-
minants of power are primarily on the lawyers side, and pursuing moral dis-
course more freely [w]hen the determinants are equal or primarily on the side 
of the client, id. at 394. See also id. at 39196 (discussing several factors for 
the lawyer to consider in deciding how intensely to pursue moral discourse 
with the client). 
 193. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 4952. 
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likely to share . . . some of the moral values that are most likely 
to be relevant in the law officejustice, mercy and truthful-
nesswhich can provide a starting point for addressing moral 
issues.194 But Shaffer and Cochran do not shy away from 
moral discourse between lawyers and clients whose morality is 
starkly different.195 In their view, diversity in moral values 
provides unique opportunities for growth because moral in-
sight often comes from conversation with someone who sees a 
problem from a different point of view.196 
2. Rex and the Lawyer as Friend Model 
If Rex were a lawyer in the Shaffer and Cochran tradition, 
his primary commitments would be to the relationship with 
Tina and Donna, to their moral development, to his own moral 
development, and to their common pursuit of the good. A law-
yer operating under the friendship model would approach the 
moral questions with humility and would be open to changing 
his views through moral dialogue with his clients. Upon hear-
ing Tina and Donna describe their situation and their goals, he 
would not be as quick to show them the door and instead would 
be more likely to welcome the opportunity for the moral 
growthboth theirs and his ownthat having clients with 
such different values would present. 
But could Rex successfully take the approach suggested by 
Shaffer and Cochran as a framework for moral discourse?197 As 
a first step in this framework, Rex would attempt to involve or 
empower Tina and Donna through empathic responses, active 
listening techniques, and direct acknowledgment that the law-
yer is not an expert on the life of the client, and that the 
thoughts, feelings, and values of the client will be most impor-
tant in determining much of what they do during the represen-
tation.198 Although Rex would try hard to do this, for reasons 
 
 194. Id. at 49. 
 195. Id. at 50. 
 196. Id.; see also Cochran, supra note 173, at 395 (arguing that although 
[w]e find it easier to discuss moral problems with those who share a common 
tradition with us, we can also gain insight from those who are different from 
us). 
 197. Unlike Luban and Simon, see supra Part III.AB, Shaffer and Coch-
ran are quite specific in laying out a technique that the lawyer can use to walk 
the line they draw between raising moral issues and imposing values on the 
client. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 11334; see also Cochran, supra 
note 173, at 38390. 
 198. Cochran, supra note 173, at 385; see id. at 38385; see also SHAFFER & 
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previously discussed,199 it is doubtful that he would be able to 
truly empathize with Tina and Donna without suspending 
some of his very deeply held values. Furthermore, because the 
lawyer when acting as a friend must remain genuinely engaged 
in the dialogue and open to mutual striving for the good, the 
strategy of moral detachment and its default to purely legal in-
terests would not be available to a lawyer operating under the 
lawyer as friend model. 
As a second step, Rex would try to sensitize Tina and 
Donna to the moral concerns raised by their situation, asking 
them what effect their decisions will have not only on their in-
terests, but also on the interests of others.200 For example, he 
might ask them how they think their child will feel being raised 
in a lesbian home or whether they think their child will regret 
growing up without knowing his or her father. Following 
Shaffer and Cochrans framework, Rex would then move on to 
introducing moral judgment into the dialogue by beginning to 
frame the questions about the effects on others in moral terms 
of fairness, kindness, or justice.201 For example, Rex might ask 
Tina and Donna whether they think it will be fair to their child 
to raise him or her in a home without a father or in a lifestyle 
that may be damaging to the childs emotional or psychological 
well-being. 
At this point, it is probable that the moral dialogue would 
simply break down. It is difficult to see how this kind of ques-
tioning could stay within the boundaries of deference to Tina 
and Donnas fundamental moral values. If he is to remain au-
thentic, it seems that Rex would either have to confront Tina 
and Donna with his own fundamental values, accept their an-
swer that they do not think that their lifestyle is immoral or 
damaging to children, or take the conversation to an even 
deeper level of moral conversation to try to reconcile the fun-
damental moral differences on the basis of some deeper level of 
shared values. 
However, the most likely scenario is that Rex would even-
tually perceive himself to be in a situation that Shaffer and 
 
COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 11415 (discussing how the lawyer can involve the 
client in decision making). 
 199. See supra notes 6170, 11214 and accompanying text. 
 200. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 11920; see also Cochran, 
supra note 173, at 38586. 
 201. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 12528; see also Cochran, 
supra note 173, at 38690. 
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Cochran describe as failed mutuality, in which the client is 
determin[ed] to walk a road the lawyer cannot take.202 As in 
the moral activist and contextualist models, Rex would proba-
bly decline to represent Tina and Donna. However, the reasons 
for declining representation are neither as judgmental as those 
of the moral activist nor as comfortably authoritative as those 
of the contextual lawyer. Instead, Rex would probably feel a 
tinge of regret that he was unable to reach a common moral 
ground with Tina and Donna or that, in their determination to 
walk their chosen road, they missed an opportunity to seek the 
path of goodness that would make them better people. 
The problem with the lawyer as friend model is that 
though subtler, it is still based on an agenda to move the client 
in a particular moral direction: toward the good. As previ-
ously explained, it is far easier from our internal moral per-
spectives to accept the fallibility of someone elses conception of 
the good than it is to admit that our own views are in error.203 
Even if we believe, as Shaffer and Cochran suggest, that un-
derneath our moral plurality a level of shared values exists,204 
the law-office context seems ill suited to moral conversations of 
the depth required to reconcile sharply divergent moral views. 
Setting aside the probably prohibitive emotional and psycho-
logical costs, we have to wonder, for example, whether Rex 
would be billing Tina and Donna for the time they would all be 
investing in a process of such deep exploration and attempted 
reconciliation of moral values that arise from such different 
sources. 
D. INADEQUACY OF THE LAWYERING MODELS 
When moral pluralism is taken into account, neither the 
traditional model nor the alternative social justice lawyering 
models adequately explain the lawyers role in the gap between 
 
 202. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 52. 
 203. See supra notes 6465 and accompanying text. Coming from a reli-
gious perspective, Howard Lesnick also discusses the tension between the 
truth value with which a religious lawyer would regard certain moral claims 
and the problem of moral relativism that affirming a plurality of moral views 
might presuppose. Lesnick, supra note 14, at 1490. He resolves the tension by 
noting that the problem with objective truth is not its existence, but its acces-
sibility to our discernment. Id. Since all human beings necessarily fall short 
of divine understanding, pluralism both allows evil to masquerade as truth 
and permits one to use plural judgments about truth to come closer to its col-
lective discernment. See id. at 149091. 
 204. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 6, at 49. 
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law and justice. In the case of the traditional lawyering model, 
the lawyer is free to proceed with the representationand may 
even be encouraged to undertake itwithout regard to the 
lawyers own moral commitments. However, this view disre-
gards the important role that moral considerations may play in 
legal interpretation and client counseling. This view also fails 
to address the distorting effects that amoral lawyering may 
create, especially in the face of fundamental moral disagree-
ment between the lawyer and the client, where empathy fails to 
bridge the gap. By contrast, the social justice models, by equat-
ing the lawyers judgments of the morality or justice of the cli-
ents cause with the public interest, state or imply that if the 
lawyer is unable to represent the client for reasons based on 
the lawyers judgments of what is moral, just, or good, then the 
client is simply undeserving of legal representation. Disturb-
ingly, the social justice models do not suggest that the better 
result would be for Tina and Donna to have a different law-
yera lesbian-friendly lawyer who could view the morality and 
justice of their objectives from a shared point of vieweven 
though this is what social justice in a morally pluralistic society 
would seem to require. 
IV.  MORAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
This section introduces a framework for understanding 
moral disagreements between lawyers and clients as moral 
conflicts of interest that may impair legal representation. This 
framework neither sets a lawyers moral commitments aside as 
extrinsic to legal representation nor equates them with the 
public good. Rather, it views the lawyers moral commitments 
as part of the package of services that the lawyer brings to the 
client. It thus prefers the social justice models inclusion of a 
lawyers consideration of issues of morality and justice as in-
trinsic to legal representation over the traditional models view 
of them as extrinsic considerations that must be transcended in 
an effort to provide neutral and technical legal representation. 
As a consequence, a moral conflict of interest framework con-
templates that a lawyers moral commitments, like his or her 
financial commitments, may in some cases impair the lawyers 
loyalty and independence of professional judgment. This im-
pairment springs from the important and sometimes inextrica-
ble rolenoted by the social justice theoriststhat judgments 
about morality and justice play in the lawyers interpretation of  
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what the law allows or requires, as well as in discussions with 
the client about the wisdom, prudence, and morality of the cli-
ents goals. 
A. MORAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICAL STANDARDS 
At their core, conflict of interest analyses arise out of a 
concern that two essential features of a lawyer-client relation-
ship, loyalty and independent professional judgment, might be 
impaired by a lawyers other commitments.205 Although im-
pairment is typically thought to arise from duties owed to other 
clients206 or from the lawyers own financial interests,207 the 
building blocks for a moral conflict of interest analysis are al-
ready present in existing ethical rules. For example, the con-
flict of interest rule set forth in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (Model Rules) prohibits (with certain exceptions) rep-
resentation that may be materially limited by . . . a personal 
interest of the lawyer.208 Later rules clarify that a lawyers 
personal interest includes such things as his or her strong 
political beliefs.209 Likewise, the preamble to the Model Rules 
refers to the fact that ethical problems may arise from a con-
flict between a lawyers responsibilities to clients, to the legal 
system and to the lawyers own interest in remaining an ethical 
person.210 Additionally, the standards in the Model Rules gov-
erning acceptance of court appointments and withdrawal from 
representation recognize that if a lawyer finds a clients cause 
or an action the client insists on taking to be personally re-
pugnant, representation may be impaired. But neither stan-
dard mandates that the lawyer decline or withdraw from repre-
sentation under such circumstances.211 
 
 205. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2002). 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id. R. 1.8(a). 
 208. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2). According to the commentary to Rule 1.7, a conflict of 
interest materially limit[s] representation if it will materially interfere with 
the lawyers independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or 
foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the 
client. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 8. 
 209. Id. R. 1.10 cmt. 3. 
 210. Id. pmbl., para. 9 (emphasis added). 
 211. The Model Rules permit lawyers to seek to decline appointment if, 
among other reasons, the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as 
to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyers ability to 
represent the client. Id. R. 6.2(c). A similar standard of repugnan[ce] or 
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Using these building blocks in the existing rules, it is pos-
sible to recognize moral conflicts of interest under traditional 
conflict of interest standards. A moral conflict of interest analy-
sis would require individual lawyers merely to ask the same 
question about their personal moral commitments that they 
ask about their own financial commitments: whether their 
commitments will materially limit whatever level of moral 
engagement is necessary for effective, partisan representation 
in the case at hand.212 Applying traditional conflict of interest 
principles, if a lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will 
be able to provide competent and diligent representation213 
notwithstanding the existence of a conflict of interest, the law-
yer must typically disclose the conflict to the client and give the 
client the option of consenting to the representation.214 If the 
client does not consent, or if the lawyer cannot reasonably con-
clude that he or she can provide competent and diligent repre-
sentation215 in the face of moral disagreement with the clients 
objectives, then the lawyer must decline the representation.216 
The lesbian family planning scenario discussed in this Ar-
ticle represents a paradigmatic example of a moral conflict of 
interest that would require a lawyer to refuse representation. 
As with other conflict of interest paradigmssuch as a lawyer 
who simultaneously represents the plaintiff and the defendant 
 
fundamental disagreement defines a permissive ground for withdrawal from 
a case that the lawyer has voluntarily undertaken. Id. R. 1.16(b)(4) ([A] law-
yer may withdraw from representing a client if . . . the client insists upon tak-
ing action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a 
fundamental disagreement.). However, a lawyers request to be relieved of 
representation may be denied even if this showing is made. Id. R. 1.16(c). It 
should be noted that the Model Rules are much more amenable to recognizing 
a moral conflict of interest than is the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity (Model Code). For example, the Model Code specifically states that repug-
nance of the subject matter of the proceeding is not a compelling reason[ ] 
excusing a lawyer from a court-appointed case. MODEL CODE OF PROFL RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 2-29 (1980). 
 212. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002) (recognizing 
that a lawyers personal interests may give rise to a conflict of interest that 
may prohibit the lawyer from representing a client). 
 213. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1). 
 214. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4) (requiring the lawyer to obtain informed consent, con-
firmed in writing, from each client affected by the conflict of interest). For a 
full description of the circumstances under which a lawyer is permitted to seek 
the clients consent to a conflict, see id. R. 1.7(b). 
 215. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1). 
 216. Cf. id. R. 1.7 (stating in general terms when a lawyer must decline 
representation due to a conflict of interest). 
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in the same lawsuitthe value of the paradigm is to provide a 
yardstick against which lesser conflicts can be measured and 
compared.217 The lesbian family planning example serves this 
role in two ways: First, the divergence between the lawyers 
moral commitments and the clients objectives in this example 
is fundamental and irreconcilable. Second, the moral diver-
gence is directly and centrally implicated in the tasks of legal 
representation. Not all moral disagreements between lawyers 
and clients will pose such an insurmountable barrier to repre-
sentation. A reduction of either factorthe degree of moral dis-
agreement between lawyer and client or the centrality of moral 
issues to the casewould diminish the conflict.218 Although not 
addressed specifically in this Article, it should also be noted 
that intense moral identification between a lawyer and a client 
may create conflict of interest problems of its own.219 
A moral conflict of interest standard would not require a 
lawyer to disclose his or her moral views to every client in 
every case, any more than the lawyer need disclose his or her 
 
 217. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (describing directly adverse conflicts as 
arising (1) when a lawyer act[s] as an advocate in one matter against a person 
the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly 
unrelated; and (2) when [a] lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who 
appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client); id. R. 1.7 cmt. 7 
(adding that such a conflict may also arise when a lawyer is asked to repre-
sent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the 
lawyer . . . in another, unrelated matter). 
 218. As the Model Rules suggest, Ordinarily, clients may consent to repre-
sentation notwithstanding a conflict. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 14. David Wilkins has 
illustrated how consent might be a viable option even in an extreme example 
of moral conflict: the case of Anthony Griffin, a black lawyer who chose to rep-
resent a grand dragon of the Ku Klux Klan in opposing a request for a Klan 
membership list. Wilkins, supra note 109, at 1030, 1038. While such a wide 
divergence in moral perspectives is likely to pose considerable challenges to 
effective representation, Griffin avoided these challenges by limiting his rep-
resentation to the First Amendment rights that were implicated by the case. 
See id. at 104344, 105354. 
 219. See generally Spaulding, supra note 14. Norman Spaulding advocates 
a client-centered model of lawyering founded on the principles of competent 
service to clients and access to legal services by the public, a model that pre-
fers thin rather than thick personal identification between lawyer and cli-
ent. Id. at 1719. He argues that an identification that is too thick may im-
pair a lawyers independent professional judgment. Id. at 2238 (discussing 
role confusion, lawlessness, maldistribution of legal services, and professional 
balkanization as four dangers that may arise when there is thick identifica-
tion); cf. discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (describing a conscientious tax objection 
situation in which thick identification may be considered as impairing pro-
fessional judgment). However, a full exploration of this type of moral conflict 
of interest is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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financial holdings to every client in every case. Many instances 
of moral difference will simply not raise a conflict of interest 
problem. A lawyer and client may hold divergent moral views
even on fundamental moral issuesbut the legal representa-
tion may not bring those divergent moral considerations into 
play. For example, Rex may encounter no impairment in repre-
senting Tina and Donna in a dispute with a neighbor about an 
easement on their property because that legal dispute would 
not raise his fundamental disagreement with them over the 
morality of homosexuality. Similarly, a lawyer and a client may 
subscribe to very different sources of moral authority but reach 
similar conclusions on many of the ordinary moral considera-
tions that are likely to arise in legal representation and hence 
see no reason to explore the underlying justifications for their 
views.220 
B. RELUCTANCE TO EMBRACE MORAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Despite the amenability of existing conflict of interest 
standards to recognition of moral conflicts of interest, the bar 
has been reluctant to fully embrace a moral conflict of interest 
standard. Two state bar opinions help to illustrate this reluc-
tance. 
1. Moral Opposition to Abortion 
In 1996, a Tennessee lawyer sought an ethics opinion on 
whether he could, on the basis of his moral and religious be-
liefs, decline court appointments to represent minors who were 
seeking judicial waivers of parental consent to obtain abor-
tions.221 The lawyer stated that he [was] a devout Catholic and 
[could not], under any circumstances, advocate a point of view 
 
 220. See, e.g., Wendel, Public Values, supra note 14, at 114 (drawing on 
Rawlss conception of an overlapping consensus to note that two parties 
[may] agree on normative principles to resolve a dispute even if they disagree 
about more deeply held or fundamental principles because [t]he locus of cer-
tainty is the particular case, not the moral first principles); see also Pepper, 
supra note 1, at 19799 (making the similar point that even if different indi-
viduals apply different theories to justify and explain their moral positions, 
their moral intuitions often converge). 
 221. Bd. of Prof l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal Ethics Op. 
96-F-140 at 1, 3 (June 13, 1996) [hereinafter Tenn. Formal Op. 96-F-140], 
available at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/Ethics/BdofProResp/_PDF_ 
Files/92-99/96-f-140.pdf; see also Lesnick, supra note 14, at 146971 (discuss-
ing the Tennessee ethics opinion in arguing that the legal profession should 
accommodate and respect the lawyers religious beliefs). 
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ultimately resulting in . . . the loss of human life.222 At least 
implicitly drawing on conflict of interest principles, the lawyer 
argued that his moral views would impair his ability to counsel 
minor clients effectively in judicial bypass proceedings.223 He 
even sought ethical permission to advise his clients about al-
ternatives to abortion and permission to counsel them to speak 
with their parents or legal guardians224the very thing the 
minors were seeking to avoid with a judicial bypass. 
The Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee rejected the lawyers claim, finding that 
[a]lthough counsels religious and moral beliefs are clearly fer-
vently held,225 they did not constitute a compelling reason[] 
to decline a court appointment in the absence of a further fac-
tual record showing that they created a conflict of interest.226 In 
so doing, the Board treated the lawyers desire to engage his 
moral sensibilities as a self-indulgent act from which he should 
simply abstain rather than as an impairment of his lawyering 
abilities. The Board highlighted the dangers of the lawyer im-
posing his moral views on his clients through such a counseling 
process, noting that counsel strongly recommend[ing] that his 
client discuss the potential abortion with her parents or with 
other individuals or entities which are known to oppose such a 
choice would call[] into question the lawyers duty of undi-
vided loyalty to his client.227 However, the Board instructed the 
lawyer that his moral beliefs must yield to the moral beliefs  
 
 
 222. Tenn. Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 221, at 3. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1. 
 225. Id. at 3. 
 226. See id. at 35. The Board pointed out that Tennessees professional 
responsibility standards tracked the Model Code rather than the Model Rules. 
See id. at 3. Hence, the standards mirrored the language of EC 2-29, which 
states that a lawyer should not seek to be excused from undertaking [a repre-
sentation by court appointment or bar association request] except for compel-
ling reasons. MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-29 (1980); see also 
Tenn. Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 221, at 3 (referring to the Model Code). 
The Board cited the Model Code provision to specify that 
[c]ompelling reasons . . . do not include such factors as: . . . the re-
pugnance of the subject matter of the proceeding, the identity or posi-
tion of a person involved in the case, the belief of the lawyer that the 
defendant in a criminal proceeding is guilty, or the belief of the law-
yer regarding the merits of the civil case. 
Id. at 34 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-29 (1980)). 
 227. Tenn. Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 221, at 2. 
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of his clients,228 thereby embracing the traditionalist view that 
moral transcendence is possible and preferable. 
Had the Board been sensitive to a moral conflict of interest 
analysis, it would have accepted the lawyers request not to be 
appointed by the juvenile court in cases involving judicial by-
pass of parental consent to abortion. The lawyer here articu-
lated a strong personal moral objection to representing minors 
in judicial bypass proceedings and claimed that such moral ob-
jection would affect his ability to provide legal representation 
and counseling.229 In fact, he expressed a desire to counsel mi-
nors out of taking advantage of the very procedure that he was 
appointed to assist them in using.230 Under a moral conflict of 
interest standard, this kind of fundamental moral opposition to 
a clients pursuit of a clearly lawful objective would be viewed, 
like the lesbian family planning example, as a nonwaivable 
conflict. In other words, the lawyer probably would have been 
compelled to decline representation even if he had desired to 
take the cases. 
2. Conscientious Tax Objection 
In 2003, a California lawyer sought an ethics opinion from 
the State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional 
Responsibility and Conduct regarding professional ethics issues 
raised by her sincere belief that the entire state and federal 
tax system is immoral.231 The lawyer had joined an association 
that opposed taxation and had publicly advocated civil disobe-
dience in the form of refusing to pay taxes.232 Her practice, 
however, included business transactional work and estate and 
tax-planning services, and she stated that she had received a 
substantial number of client referrals from her speeches on be-
half of and through her contacts in the [association].233 The 
lawyer said that despite her beliefs and her public advocacy 
that the tax laws are immoral and ought to be resisted, she ad- 
 
 
 228. Id. at 5 (quoting Bd. of Prof l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 
Formal Ethics Op. 84-F-73 (1984)). 
 229. Id. at 3. 
 230. See id. at 2.  
 231. See State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof l Responsibility & Con-
duct, Formal Op. No. 2003-162 at 1 (2003) [hereinafter Cal. Formal Op. 2003-
162], available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/ethics/OPN_2003_162.pdf. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
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vised her clients to abide by the law, a practice that the Com-
mittee endorsed.234 
In its opinion, the Committee deviated from the more tra-
ditional view of lawyers as legal technicians and questioned the 
lawyers competence to represent clients in tax matters.235 
Based on the fairly broad definition of competence in Califor-
nias ethics rulesa definition that includes an emotional com-
ponent236the Committee observed that the lawyers mental 
or emotional state could prevent[] her from performing an ob-
jective evaluation of her clients legal position, providing unbi-
ased advice to her client, or performing her legal representation 
according to her clients directions.237 In other words, the 
Committee acknowledged that because the lawyer was ideologi-
cally committed to resisting tax laws, she might have a ten-
dency to discount client values that ran counter to the goal of 
avoiding those laws.238 
Curiously, the Committee failed to carry its insight about 
the adverse effects that the lawyers ideological commitments 
may have on her competence to the conclusion that those com-
mitments raised a potential conflict of interest.239 The Commit-
tee treated the conflict of interest issue as a potential conflict 
between the lawyers activities with an association that advo-
cates taxpayer civil disobedience and the representation of cli-
ents. It did not address the potential conflict between the law-
yers personal moral commitments and her clients interests.240 
Despite noting the potential for impaired representation, the 
Committee concluded that the lawyer need not disclose her re-
lationship with the anti-tax association to any of her present or 
prospective clients.241  
 
 234. Id. at 12. 
 235. See id. at 34. 
 236. Id. at 3. Specifically, the California rule defined competence as the 
application of the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional 
and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance of legal ser-
vices. Id. (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3-110(B)); cf. MODEL 
RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) (Competent representation requires 
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation.). 
 237. Cal. Formal Op. 2003-162, supra note 231, at 3. 
 238. See supra notes 10002 and accompanying text for examples of how 
clients values may be overridden or ignored by lawyers who unreflectively as-
sume that clients wish to maximize their tax savings. 
 239. See Cal. Formal Op. 2003-162, supra note 231, at 23. 
 240. See id. at 23. 
 241. Id. 
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For clients who had sought the lawyers tax-planning ser-
vices as a result of attending her public presentations advocat-
ing tax resistance, the potential for conflict is less of a concern. 
Those clients would have chosen her knowing her viewsand 
quite probably because her views coincided with their goals. 
However, one can imagine that the situation would be quite dif-
ferent for clients who had simply sought her tax-planning ad-
vice without knowing her moral opposition to taxation. In those 
cases, the potential for divergence between the lawyers ideo-
logical commitments and her clients goals would be greater. 
Her clients would seemingly have a right, under conflict of in-
terest standards, to disclosure and consent to the potential im-
pairment of independent professional judgment that the Com-
mittee had identified. Yet the Committee declined to treat the 
lawyers commitments as creating a potential conflict of inter-
est subject to disclosure and consent requirements. 
These cases demonstrate the bars reluctance to fully com-
mit to a moral conflict of interest standard, despite available 
building blocks in the professional standards governing compe-
tence, withdrawal, and declining court appointments. As the 
next section demonstrates, this reluctance may well be rooted 
in a deeper professional concern for providing universal repre-
sentation and access to justice in a way that remains neutral 
between competing moral viewpoints. This deeper concern is 
not trivial. Embracing a moral conflict of interest framework 
would undoubtedly aggravate the logistical challenges of pro-
viding universal representation by encouraging lawyers to pre-
judge their willingness and ability to represent clients when 
confronted with moral division. However, even noting the likely 
impact on the provision of legal services, this Article argues 
that the benefits of a moral conflict of interest framework 
would outweigh its costs because the framework would not so 
much change the realities attending the provision of legal ser-
vices to needy clients as it would elevate the ideal against 
which access to justice is gauged. 
C. MORAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND MORAL ABSTENTION 
FROM REPRESENTATION: THE LAST LAWYER IN TOWN PROBLEM 
Though not requiring changes to existing ethical rules, the 
conceptualization of lawyers moral beliefs as potential sources 
of moral conflicts of interest provides a new and different 
framework within which issues at the intersection of morality 
and law can be analyzed and discussed. This section explores 
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how a moral conflict of interest framework would both illumi-
nate and redefine the debate over moral abstention from repre-
sentation. Though theoretically sound and in many ways more 
satisfactory than traditional approaches, the reconceptualiza-
tion of moral abstention has some troubling implications for is-
sues of access to justice. 
Moral abstentionor the refusal by a lawyer to accept a 
case on moral groundsreveals an underlying tension between 
lawyers discretion in client selection and a duty held by the 
profession as a whole to make legal representation universally 
available to all who need it.242 Professional ethical standards 
attempt to mediate this tension by permitting lawyers to exer-
cise wide-ranging autonomy in client selection, except in cases 
of great public need. Hence, lawyers are generally free to accept 
or decline cases for any reason, including moral disagreement 
with clients aims.243 However, ethical standards contain excep-
tions or limitations on lawyers generally unchecked autonomy 
to accept or decline representation when it comes to politically 
unpopular or financially needy clients.244 
 
 242.  Both the Model Code and the Model Rules charge lawyers with such a 
duty. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1980) (A 
Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Le-
gal Counsel Available[.]); MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 6.2 (2002) (A 
lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person 
except for good cause . . . .).  
 243. E.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 573 (student ed. 
1986) (stating that with the exception of unpopular clients in need of represen-
tation and court appointments, a lawyer may refuse to represent a client for 
any reason at allbecause the client cannot pay the lawyers demanded fee; 
because the client is not of the lawyers race or socioeconomic status; because 
the client is weird or not, tall or short, thin or fat, moral or immoral). 
 244. For example, the Model Code discourages lawyers from lightly de-
clin[ing] proffered employment and suggests that in furtherance of the objec-
tive of the bar to make legal services fully available, lawyers should accept 
[their] share of tendered employment which may be unattractive both to 
[them] and the bar generally. MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY EC 
2-26 (1980). Likewise, when a court seeks to appoint a lawyer for a person 
unable to obtain counsel, the Model Code states that the lawyer should not 
seek to be excused . . . except for compelling reasons, which do not include 
such factors as the repugnance of the subject matter of the proceeding, the 
identity or position of a person involved in the case . . . or the belief of the law-
yer regarding the merits of [a] civil case. Id. at EC 2-29 (endnote omitted). 
The Model Rules soften this proscription somewhat, allowing a lawyer to seek 
to decline a court appointment if the client or the cause is so repugnant to the 
lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship. MODEL RULES 
OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 6.2(c) (2002). However, the Model Rules seek to shield 
lawyers from public criticism for taking on unpopular cases with the dis-
claimer that [a] lawyers representation of a client, including representation 
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Though ethically permitted in most cases, the appropriate-
ness of a lawyers moral abstention has been the subject of de-
bate in legal ethics.245 The predominant view is to cast the 
question of moral abstention as a struggle between the lawyers 
personal moral autonomythe right not to be called into pro-
fessional service over ones moral objectionand the lawyers 
professional duty of public service.246 Viewed in the light of this 
predominant rubric, a lawyers moral abstention appears on the 
same ground as claims by other professionals. Pharmacists, for 
example, are currently embroiled in a debate over whether it is 
permissible for them to refuse, on moral grounds, to fill pre-
scriptions for certain contraceptive medications or the morning 
after pill.247 
The tensions between the individual autonomy of individ-
ual lawyers in client selection and the bars concern with pro-
viding universal legal representation to all clients regardless of 
moral or political popularity are illustrated by what has come 
to be called the last lawyer in town problem.248 The last law-
yer in town problem arises out of the injustice created when the 
legal profession fails to provide representation to clients with 
legally cognizable claims because of the sequential operation of 
lawyers individual choices not to represent them.249 In other 
words, the concern is not with any one lawyer refusing services 
 
by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the clients political, 
economic, social or moral views or activities. Id. R. 1.2(b). The commentary to 
Rule 1.2 reveals nonaccountability as integral to a strategy of encouraging 
universal representation by protecting lawyers from public censure for the cli-
ent representation choices they make. See id. R. 1.2 cmt. 5. (Legal representa-
tion should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or 
whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval.). 
 245. See, e.g., Symposium on the Lawyers Amoral Ethical Role, supra note 
10. 
 246. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 243, at 575 (describing lawyers as hav-
ing nonmandatory professional obligation[s] to do their fair share of repre-
senting unpopular clients that pit[ ] . . . the social ethic of universal legal rep-
resentation against a lawyers possible individual moral values). 
 247. See, e.g., Monica Davey & Pam Belluck, Pharmacies Balk on After-Sex 
Pill and Widen Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at A1. 
 248. See generally Teresa Stanton Collett, The Common Good and the Duty 
to Represent: Must the Last Lawyer in Town Take Any Case?, 40 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 137 (1999) (discussing whether it is morally permissible for a lawyer to 
refuse to represent a client who is seeking immoral ends if the client would be 
unlikely to otherwise obtain legal representation). 
 249. See, e.g., id. at 138; Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advo-
cate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS ROLES AND LAWYERS ETHICS, supra 
note 122, at 150, 16869. 
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to a client for moral reasons, but is rather with the specter of 
every lawyer exercising this right of refusal, until the client is 
left with no lawyer at all. 
The last lawyer in town problem has two aspects: a logical 
aspect and a logistical aspect. In its logical aspect, the last law-
yer in town problem is a hypothetical story that illustrates the 
problem of free riding that arises by virtue of a collective duty 
(held by the legal profession as a whole) to provide legal repre-
sentation, a duty that must be implemented through the ac-
tions of individual lawyers. The story posits a client whom 
every lawyer in a hypothetical town full of lawyers (which 
represents the legal profession) would be loath to represent.250 
The first lawyer in town would be free to refuse to represent 
the client because other lawyers are available to help the legal 
profession meet its collective duty to provide universal repre-
sentation. The second lawyer in town would also be justified in 
refusing representation, as would the third and fourth and so 
on until the client reached the last lawyer in town. At that 
point, because the client had been refused representation by 
every other available lawyer, the only way for the legal profes-
sion to realize its collective duty to provide universal represen-
tation is for the last lawyer in town to take the case.251 How-
ever, the professional duty of the last lawyer in town logically 
implies a duty on every other lawyer in town to take the case, 
rather than free riding on his or her ability to pass off the pro-
fessions collective duty of providing universal representation to 
some other lawyer based on the happenstance that he or she 
had been approached first rather than last.252 
 
 250. See, e.g., Collett, supra note 248, at 145 (explaining that to test the 
last lawyer in town problem, it is necessary to posit a set of facts that com-
mand broad agreement as to the legality but immorality of the clients objec-
tives); Schwartz, supra note 249, at 165 (noting that the problem requires one 
to assume a case as to which there would be a consensus about the immoral-
ity and potential harm of some contemplated behavior that is not prohibited 
by law). 
 251. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 249, at 169. 
 252. See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 59, at 660 (arguing for a presumption 
that each lawyer has the (enforceable) obligations of the last lawyer in town 
because of the psychological and financial costs involved in getting to the last 
lawyer as well as the difficulty of knowing when the last lawyer has effec-
tively been reached); Wendel, supra note 10, at 387 ([T]he reasons that [the 
last lawyer in town] should continue to represent the client . . . are generaliz-
able to the situation of the second-to-last lawyer as well.). But see Schwartz, 
supra note 249, at 169 (Were a lawyer to volunteer for the representation 
without independent moral justification, the expression of [moral repugnance 
to the proposed conduct by all lawyers] would be lost. The lawyer should let 
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Once the existence of moral pluralism is taken into ac-
count, the logical part of the last lawyer in town problem effec-
tively disappears. The logical problem depends on the premise 
that all available lawyers share the same set of moral values 
and would find the same clients morally repugnant. The hypo-
thetical universe of available lawyers looks different, though, 
once moral pluralism is introduced because the universe is now 
morally diverse. There may be many clients whom the first 
lawyer would be morally loath to represent, but these clients 
would not present the same moral quandary to the second law-
yer. When the first lawyer refuses representation on grounds of 
moral repugnance, he or she can be seen not as free riding, 
but rather as passing the client on to a lawyer who is more ca-
pable of representing the client without the impairment of 
moral conflict. 
By employing a moral conflict of interest framework, a law-
yers decision not to represent a client on moral grounds can 
thus be cast in a new light that differentiates that decision 
from the claims of other professionals who might wish to exer-
cise their moral autonomy to refuse professional service. Under 
a moral conflict of interest framework, moral abstention is re-
defined as a component of a lawyers duty to provide competent 
representation. While the source of the conflict lies in a lawyers 
resistance to acting in ways that are contrary to the lawyers 
personal moral views, the reason for morally abstaining is to 
protect the interests of the client. Reinterpreted through a 
moral conflict of interest framework, moral abstention is 
viewed as a protection of the public from lawyers who are un-
able to provide legal representation characterized by unim-
paired loyalty and independent professional judgment rather 
than as self-indulgence. 
The logistical side of the last lawyer in town problem is dif-
ferent and is in many ways more challenging. The logistical 
problem is concerned with actual communities of lawyers and 
with the practical problem of clients finding lawyers willing to 
represent them. It does not go away when the existence of 
moral pluralism is taken into account because it recognizes the 
practical problem of outsiders with morally defensible and le-
gally cognizable claims who may get shut out of legal represen-
tation in particularly closed and homogeneous legal communi-
 
the rejection process play out its string.). 
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ties.253 The next section turns to these logistical challenges, es-
pecially as they impact the delivery of legal services to those 
who rely on the beneficence of pro bono or government-
subsidized legal assistance. 
D. MORAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
It is tempting at first glance to say that recognizing moral 
conflicts of interest would do little damage to existing systems 
for delivering legal services, except perhaps to provide a check 
on some of the more self-interested reasons that motivate law-
yers to distribute their legal services to well-paying clients with 
questionable moral aims.254 Given the generally unchecked 
autonomy that lawyers already exercise over client selection, 
and the personal repugnance exception to the more general 
duty to accept court appointments,255 it would seem that law-
yers already have permission to decline cases on moral 
grounds. The larger impact of requiring lawyers to do so would 
seem to fall on lawyers who choose to take cases despite their 
moral distaste for particular clients or causes. These lawyers 
are more likely to be found among the ranks of the rich and 
powerful, representing clients who can pay them enough money 
to assuage their moral qualms. 
However, by imposing professional pressure on lawyers to 
prejudge the morality of the kinds of cases or clients they un-
dertake to represent, the effects of embracing a moral conflict of 
interest standard go deeper into the legal culture in ways that 
would affect the delivery of legal services to clients who cannot 
afford to purchase their lawyers loyalties. This professional 
pressure comes in part from reconceptualizing moral absten-
tion as not merely a matter of lawyers autonomy but, in some 
cases, as a professional obligation. It comes also from the ne-
cessity of identifying moral conflicts of interest at an early 
point in the representation, so as to avoid the harm that may 
 
 253. As Teresa Stanton Collett has observed, Lawyers in particular geo-
graphic regions have evidenced common moral commitments, and these com-
mitments have affected the lawyers willingness to represent particular 
causes. Collett, supra note 248, at 143. Collett uses an abortion case in 
Guamdescribed as a relatively small and predominantly Catholic commu-
nityas an example of this phenomenon. Id. (quoting Guam Socy of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 254. For a recent analysis of the principles by which economic and other 
pressures distribute the resources of dispute resolution, see Robert Rubin-
son, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89 (2005). 
 255. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
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come from identifying a conflict after a significant investment 
of time and expense. The conservatism and risk aversion inher-
ent in a moral conflict of interest approach may be felt in law-
yers choices of practice area as well as their choices of clients. 
It may shield lawyers from experiencing the capacity of empa-
thy to bridge some of the gaps that they may assume exist be-
tween themselves and potential clients. The effects of moral 
prejudgment may be especially pernicious in denying legal ser-
vices to needy clients, precisely because their life circumstances 
place them in a different social class from lawyers who may 
have little real understanding of the choices and challenges 
that such clients face. 
Moreover, moral choice implies moral accountability, and 
the existence of a moral conflict of interest standard would ac-
cordingly hold lawyers publicly accountable for their client-
selection choices. To the extent that lawyers own moral com-
mitments become necessary factors (rather than just optional 
ones) in selecting clients, the moral conflict of interest standard 
would remove the protective shield currently provided by the 
disclaimer that a lawyers representation of a client does not 
represent the personal views of the lawyer.256 Subjecting law-
yers client-selection choices to this greater public scrutiny 
could erode the ideological and political support for the univer-
sal provision of counsel, which the bar employs to defend the 
representation of unpopular clients. 
These concerns are troubling. Rather than denying their 
significance, this Article instead points out the off-setting bene-
fits that would be gained by elevating the ideal of universal 
representation against which access to justice is measured. 
Universal legal representation is, after all, not a reality in our 
society but an ideal toward which our procedure-based system 
of justice aims. As currently defined, the ideal of universal rep-
resentation can be minimally met by providing a lawyerany 
lawyerto every client.257 A heightened standard for universal 
 
 256. See supra note 244. 
 257. As critics of the status quo have noted, it is a discouraging trend that 
even in cases where there is a constitutional right to counsel and the stakes 
are enormously highsuch as when a client is a defendant facing the death 
penalty in a capital casethe goal of universal representation can be met by 
providing a licensed member of the bar with nothing more than a pulse. See, 
e.g., RHODE, supra note 94, at 6263 (Courts have declined to find inadequate 
representation where attorneys were drunk, on drugs, or parking their car 
during key parts of the prosecutions case. And defendants have been executed 
despite their lawyers lack of any prior trial experience, ignorance of all rele-
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representation would change that ideal and affect the way we 
think about implementing it. For example, a more ambitious 
ideal would discourage certain types of legal service delivery 
systems, such as those in which members of a bar are auto-
matically placed on a court list for appointment in whatever 
cases a court deems necessary.258 Instead, it would encourage 
public-defender systems that permit lawyers to opt out of rep-
resentation in certain types of cases in which their representa-
tion would be compromised based on their moral or ideological 
commitments.259 And it would encourage the cultivation, finan-
cial support, and geographic deployment of lawyers with sin-
cere commitments to certain types of unpopular representation 
to meet the need for that representation where it arises. By 
making the ideal of competent representation more ambitious, 
a moral conflict of interest framework would thus challenge the 
profession to be more creative in providing better-quality legal 
representation to a wider range of clients. 
Requiring lawyers to articulate their own reasons for un-
dertaking representation in morally controversial cases rather 
than hiding behind the shield of nonaccountability might also 
enhance the goals of larger dialogue over contested moral is-
sues in a society characterized by moral pluralism. A 1993 ex-
change between Monroe Freedman and Michael Tigar in the 
Legal Times illustrates the benefits of such accountability. 
Freedman has long viewed client selection as the quintessential 
moral question for lawyers260 and would hold lawyers to a 
burden of public justification in answering the question, Is 
this really the kind of client to which I want to dedicate my 
training, my knowledge, and my skills as a lawyer?261 In 1993, 
 
vant death penalty precedents, or failure to present any mitigating evidence.); 
Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of Counsel in the Sixth 
Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 48994 (1993) (discussing the low standards 
in many jurisdictions for appointing counsel in capital cases). 
 258. Cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 243, at 57172 (discussing the English cab 
rank rule, under which barristers are required to accept any case in which 
[the barristers] clerk negotiated an appropriate fee with the clients solicitor). 
 259. See Abbe Smith, When Ideology and Duty Conflict, in ETHICAL PROB-
LEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER: PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO 
TOUGH QUESTIONS 18, 26 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995) (arguing for an opt-
out standard that asks not whether the defender could do a competent job or 
an adequate job, [but] whether the client would be proud to have that defender 
as a lawyer; whether the client will be well-served). 
 260. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS ETHICS 74 (3d ed. 2004). 
 261. See Monroe Freedman, Must You Be the Devils Advocate?, LEGAL 
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Freedman challenged Tigar to meet this burden regarding Ti-
gars representation of John Demjanjuk, the man suspected of 
being the Nazi war criminal Ivan the Terrible who oversaw the 
mass murder of Jews at the Treblinka concentration camp.262 
Tigar responded by chastising Freedman that his burden of 
public justification would undermine[] the right to represen-
tation of unpopular [clients].263 However, Tigar went on to 
meet the burden, providing an impassioned defense of the jus-
tice of Demjanjuks case,264 which is ultimately more convincing 
than a simple appeal to the justification that everyone de-
serves a lawyer. 
It should not surprise anyone that Tigars explanation of 
his choice to represent Demjanjuk is ultimately more satisfying 
than would be a simple appeal to the procedural justice of uni-
versal representation.265 By the nature of their work, lawyers 
are called on to understand and empathize with their clients 
and to tell their clients stories in ways that persuasively por-
tray their clients as the protagonists in court, in negotiation, to 
allies, and to opponents. Indeed, lawyers abilities to tell their 
clients stories convincingly from the clients perspectives are 
measures of the effectiveness of their lawyering. By requiring a 
lawyer to articulate honestly his or her reasons for taking a 
morally controversial case that the lawyer has chosen, a moral 
 
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at 19, reprinted in UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS, 
supra note 260, at B-383, B-384 to -385. 
 262. Id., reprinted in UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS, supra note 260, 
at B-383, B-385; see also Michael E. Tigar, Setting the Record Straight on the 
Defense of John Demjanjuk, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at 22, reprinted in 
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS, supra note 260, at B-385, B-385 to -386. 
 263. Tigar, supra note 262, reprinted in UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETH-
ICS, supra note 260, at B-385, B-387. However, even Tigar maintains that 
lawyers have a responsibility to their own conscience for the kinds of clients 
they choose to represent and the positions they choose to advance. Id., re-
printed in UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS, supra note 260, at B-385, B-
388. 
 264. Id., reprinted in UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS, supra note 260, 
at B-385, B-385 to -386. In this defense, Tigar notes that exculpatory evidence 
indicating that Demjanjuk was not Ivan the Terrible had been withheld from 
the defense in his trial and pleads the unfairness of his clients having lived 
for more than 16 years under a cloud of government allegations despite the 
fact that [s]ince at least 1978, the government has had solid evidence that 
these charges were false. Id., reprinted in UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS, 
supra note 260, at B-385, B-386. 
 265. For a discussion of the gap between political justifications for criminal 
defense work and the motivations that sustain public defenders, see Charles J. 
Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public De-
fenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993). 
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conflict of interest standard would help to ensure that lawyers 
are such effective advocates.  
CONCLUSION 
The stories about lawyers professional duties in the gap 
between law and justice are most often told from the point of 
view of lawyers as moral protagonists faced with immoral cli-
ents. The lesbian family planning hypothetical presented in 
this Article retells the story of moral conflict from the point of 
view of clients faced with a lawyer who cannot see them as 
moral protagonists. Modifying the classic professional respon-
sibility story in such a way allows us to explore the implications 
of moral pluralism for legal ethics. 
This Article argues that both the traditional and social jus-
tice models of lawyering fail to address adequately the concerns 
of lawyers and clients facing a fundamental moral divide. Tra-
ditionalists assert that lawyers should provide morally neutral 
access to the law, but the traditional model does not acknowl-
edge the degree to which lawyers internal moral perspectives 
prevent such neutral representation. Social justice theorists, on 
the other hand, do recognize the role that lawyers moralities 
play in legal representation, but the social justice lawyering 
models do not explain why clients who are not immoral but who 
instead morally disagree with their lawyers are entitled to any 
legal representation. 
This Article proposes a better alternative to the traditional 
and social justice models of lawyering in the form of a moral 
conflict of interest standard. This standard would prohibit law-
yers from representing clients with whom they fundamentally 
disagree on moral grounds. Mandatory disclosure and consent 
or withdrawal in such cases would ensure that clients receive 
competent and unimpaired representation from lawyers who 
view them as moral protagonists. 
Lawyering theory literature makes it clear that morality 
matters. It matters to the law, it matters to clients, and it mat-
ters to lawyers as well. Lawyers personal moral perspectives 
are not annoyances to be ignored or transcended, like an ath-
lete playing through the pain of an injury. Instead, lawyers 
moral commitments, like their financial commitments, carry 
the unique potential to interfere with their professional loyalty 
and independence of judgment. In a morally pluralistic society, 
clients deserve to be informed of and protected from such inter-
ference. 
